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Abstract
This	paper	is	a	comprehensive	presentation	of	a	framework	for	the	modeling,	the	simulation	and	the	analysis	of	power	relationships	in
social	organizations,	and	more	generally	in	systems	of	organized	action.	This	framework	relies	on,	and	slightly	extends,	the	Crozier	and
Freidber's	sociology	of	organized	action,	which	supports	a	methodology	for	understanding	why,	in	an	organizational	context,	people	behave
as	they	do.	SocLab	intends	to	complement	the	discursive	statement	of	sociological	analyses	with	a	formal	formulation	easing	the
objectivization	of	findings.	It	consists	of	a	meta-model	of	organizations,	a	model	of	bounded-rational	social	actors	and	analytical	tools	for	the
study	of	the	internal	properties	of	organizations.
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	Introduction
1.1 The	paper	deals	with	organizations,	and	more	generally	social	systems	of	organized	action,	viewed	as	social	entities:
established	for	some	purpose,	and	thus	aimed	at	achieving	some	objective(s),
including	individuals	and	resources,
provided	with	rules	intended	to	serve	the	achievement	organization's	objectives,	about	the	handling	of	the	resources	by	the
individuals,
each	of	these	elements	being	more	or	less	precisely	determined	and	recognized	for	some	time.	It	does	not	focus	on	a	specific	social
organization	but	presents	a	formal	theoretical	framework	for	the	modeling	and	the	study	of	such	organizations.	This	framework	is	underpinned
in	the	sociological	theory	of	organization,	namely	the	sociology	of	organized	action	(SOA),	also	called	strategic	analysis	(Crozier	1964;
Crozier	and	Friedberg	1980).
1.2 In	any	contexts	of	collective	action	featuring	some	duration,	the	occurrence	of	the	regulation	phenomenon	is	a	well-established	fact:	every
individual	adopts	a	quite	stable	behavior	as	if	he	obeys	precise	rules,	while	these	rules	differ,	to	a	more	or	less	large	extent,	from	the	formal
rules	that	codify	the	organization.	This	phenomenon	is	not	contingent,	since	regulation	is	necessary	for	the	proper	working	and	the	survival	of
any	system	of	collective	action.	SOA	postulates	that	the	management	of	power	relationships	are	the	core	of	interactions	between	the	actors	of
an	organization	and	support	the	mechanisms	that	govern	the	occurrence	of	regulation:	power	relationships	explain	how	behaviors	are
regularized	and	why	individuals	behave	as	they	do.	So,	SOA	is	a	generative	approach	(Fararo	1987;	Hedström	and	Swedberg	1998)	which
focuses	on	the	production	of	social	phenomena.	Through	the	study	of	organizational	processes,	it	explains,	at	least	partially,	the	phenomena
at	macro	or	meso	level	(the	regulation	of	a	system	of	organized	action)	by	activities	at	the	micro	level	(the	interactions	between	the	actors),
while,	in	return,	the	actors	of	the	system	are	constrained	by	the	regulation	that	they	have	contributed	to	build.
1.3 However,	SOA	is	hampered	in	this	generative	or	analytical	perspective	by	an	almost	exclusive	use	of	qualitative	methods.	For	the	sake	of	the
"irreducible	contingency"	of	concrete	systems	of	action,	Friedberg	does	not	believe	in	the	possibility	of	producing	general	purpose	knowledge.
He	limits	the	knowledge	project	of	SOA	to	the	perimeter	of	the	idiosyncrasy	and	the	accumulation	of	monographs	whose	value	is	essentially
pragmatic.
1.4 The	concepts	mobilized	by	SOA	reveal	to	be	sufficiently	well	defined	to	be	amenable	to	formal	definitions,	which,	although	they	are	less
expressive	than	the	discursive	approach,	catch	the	essentials	of	this	conception	of	organizations.	The	SocLab	framework	incorporates	these
concepts	and	enriches	them	thanks	to	the	systematization	induced	by	the	formalization.	This	framework	includes	a	formal	model	of	the
structure	of	social	organization	in	terms	of	power	relationships,	in	the	form	of	a	metamodel	that	will	be	instantiated	by	sociologists	to	structure
their	analysis	of	the	constitutive	elements	of	the	organization	under	consideration.	The	simulation	of	a	SocLab	model	makes	it	possible	to
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consider	under	what	conditions	and	in	what	form	the	regulation	phenomenon	can	emerge	from	the	processes	by	which	every	actor	adjusts	his
behavior	to	that	of	others.	In	the	reverse	direction,	simulation	allows	to	consider	to	what	extent	the	current	regulation	of	an	organization
influences	the	evolution	of	its	structure.	Finally,	the	formal	modeling	of	the	structure	of	organizations	opens	the	possibility	to	define	tools
allowing	to	study	analytically	their	properties,	to	compare	organizations	and	to	produce	theoretical	knowledge	whose	assessment	is	not	only	a
matter	of	subjectivity.
1.5 A	computer-based	platform	enables	to	apply	this	theoretical	framework	to	the	analysis	of	concrete	systems	of	organized	action.	The	SocLab
software	platform[1]	allows	the	user	to	edit	models	of	an	organization,	to	study	the	properties	of	models	with	analytic	tools,	and	to	compute	by
simulation	the	behaviors	that	the	organization's	members	could	adopt	the	ones	with	respect	to	others.	As	far	as	one	agree	with	the
fundaments	of	SOA,	this	platform	looks	like	a	tool	for	organizational	diagnoses	and	the	analysis	of	scenarios	regarding	possible	evolutions	of
an	organization.	It	can	be	used	also	for	the	design	of	virtual	organizations	having	no	direct	reference	to	reality,	aimed	at	the	study	of
theoretical	properties	of	organizational	configurations	featuring	particular	characteristics.
1.6 In	the	line	of	Squazzoni	(2012),	the	purpose	of	the	paper	is	to	provide	a	comprehensive	view	of	the	SocLab	framework	for	the	study	of	power
relationships	within	social	organizations,	illustrated	with	a	typical	example	of	its	use	by	means	of	the	SocLab	platform	(Mailliard	2008,	El
Gemayel	2013).	It	is	organized	as	follows.	While	the	SOA	conception	of	power	is	more	or	less	endorsed	by	most	theories	in	sociology	of
organization,	section	2	recalls	its	main	principles.	Indeed,	these	postulates	delineate	the	range	of	questions	that	may	be	addressed	by	this
theory	and	in	sociology,	the	agreement	with	the	fundaments	conditions	the	confidence	in	the	findings.	Then,	we	present	the	scene	of	the	case
study,	the	question	which	motivated	the	elaboration	of	a	SocLab	model—i.e.	the	management	policy	of	a	river	regularly	provoking	floods	in
SW	France—and	four	hypotheses	raised	by	the	empirical	study	about	power	relationships	in	the	concerned	system	of	organized	action.
Detailed	presentations	of	the	case	and	the	model	are	given	in	Sibertin-Blanc	et	al.	(2013b).
1.7 Sections	3	to	5	are	devoted	to	the	meta-model	and	its	use.	Section	3	is	a	detailed	presentation	of	the	core	of	the	meta-model	enabling	the
sociologist	analyst	to	design	formal	models	of	concrete	(or	fictive)	organizations.	We	indicate	how	the	main	elements	of	a	power	relationships
analysis	are	translated	into	a	SocLab	formal	model	and	conversely	how	the	SocLab	concepts	may	be	interpreted	in	sociological	terms.	This
section	defines	the	social	game	as	the	interplay	between	the	processes	carried	out	by	social	actors	for	the	reciprocal	adjustments	of	their
behaviors	that	leads	to	the	stabilization	of	these	behaviors,	i.e.	the	regulation	of	the	organization.	The	elements	of	the	model	of	the	case	study
are	presented	along	with	the	definition	of	the	corresponding	meta-model's	concepts.	Section	4	completes	the	presentation	of	the	meta-model
by	the	introduction	of	four	mechanisms	that	extend	its	expressiveness	in	dealing	with	organizational	arrangements.	Section	5	addresses	the
use	of	the	meta-model	that,	as	any	tool,	needs	a	"user	manual".	Indeed,	the	building	of	a	SocLab	model	requires	quantitative	data	about
individuals,	which	is	not	very	common	in	sociology.	So	we	present	an	investigation	methodology	that	includes	qualitative	interviews	whose
results	can	be	integrated	in	the	formal	model.	Then,	since	a	meta-model	is	also	a	language,	we	give	—as	elements	of	a	(rudimentary!)
pragmatics—some	hints	on	the	modeling	of	common	organizational	patterns.
1.8 Section	6	addresses	simulation	issues.	Considering	the	model	of	an	organization	as	a	multi-agent	system,	we	can	endow	the	organization's
actors	with	a	suitable	rationality	to	play	the	social	game	and	so	compute	how	the	organization	could	be	regulated.	The	plausibility	of	the
results	obtained	in	this	way	heavily	depends	on	the	rationality	principles	that	are	embedded	into	the	simulation	algorithm,	so	the	main
principles	are	presented	at	the	detriment	of	the	details	of	the	algorithm	and	are	given	in	a	companion	paper	(Sibertin-Blanc	et	al.	2013b).
Addressing	the	model	of	a	concrete	organization,	the	convergence	between	the	observed	actors'	behaviors	and	the	simulated	regulation
confirms	(or	not)	the	validity	of	the	model.	Addressing	a	virtual	organization,	e.g.	an	evolution	of	a	concrete	organization,	simulations	shed
light	on	what	could	happen.	Section	7	is	devoted	to	analytic	tools	usable	by	the	analyst	to	investigate	underlying	properties	of	an	organization
that	can	be	inferred	from	its	structure.	The	analytical	results	that	can	be	obtained	in	this	way	complement	the	simulation	results	and	improve
their	interpretation.	The	possibility	to	design	such	tools	and	to	interpret	their	results	in	sociological	terms	relies	upon	the	definition	of	the
structure	of	an	organization	as	an	algebraic	structure	amenable	to	interpretation	in	organizational	terms.
1.9 Section	8	presents	simulation	results	of	the	model	of	our	case	study.	Then,	to	the	light	of	these	results	and	a	few	analytical	considerations,	we
analyze	the	four	hypotheses	whose	study	was	the	main	motivation	for	the	building	of	the	model.	The	conclusion	summarizes	the	main
contributions	of	the	paper.
	The	Sociology	of	Organized	Action
2.1 Among	the	metaphors	identified	by	Morgan	(1997)	in	the	vast	literature	about	organizations,	sociology	of	organized	action	(SOA)	falls	within
the	"organization	as	a	political	system"[2].	This	sociology	was	initiated	by	Crozier	(1964)	and	illustrated	by	the	emblematic	example	of	the
"industrial	monopoly".	From	the	1970s,	it	has	been	widely	disseminated	in	the	field	of	social	science	and	beyond	(Crozier	and	Friedberg	1980;
Friedberg	1997;	Dupuy	2001;	Courpasson	et	al.	2012).	This	approach,	also	called	"strategic	analysis",	conceives	the	organization	in	terms	of
power	relations	between	its	member	actors.	Echoing	the	Simon's	conception	of	bounded	rationality	(Simon	1982)	and	the	achievements	of
American	sociologists	criticizing	the	Weberian	ideal-type	of	bureaucracy	(Adler	2009),	Crozier	bases	his	method	of	sociological	analysis	of
organizations	on	four	postulates.
2.2 The	first	is	to	consider	the	organization	as	a	construct,	produced	by	the	actions	of	its	members,	which	is	never	fully	determined	neither	by	its
environment,	unlike	the	structural	contingency	theory	(Aldrich	and	Pfeffer	1976),	nor	by	the	organization	chart	or	the	formal	rules	whose
practical	applications	always	require	a	contextual	interpretation.
2.3 The	second	postulate	concerns	the	actor	of	the	organization	who	is	never	reducible	to	a	mere	instrument	of	the	latter.	Having	goals,	more	or
less	conscious	but	still	partially	distinguishable	from	those	assigned	by	the	organization,	the	actor	develops	a	strategic	behavior	aimed	at
achieving	his	objectives.	This	sociological	approach	is	clearly	different	from	the	institutionalist	theories	which	focus	on	the	institutional	and
collective	dimension	of	the	organizational	phenomena	(see	for	example	DiMaggio	and	Powell	1991).	It	also	differs	from	theories	which	do	not
reduce	the	individual	action	to	its	strategic	dimension,	such	as	the	justification	theory	which	is	interested	in	the	compromises	between
"principles	of	justice"	(Boltanski	and	Thévenot	1991).
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/16/4/8.html 2 15/10/2015
2.4 The	third	considers	that	the	strategy	of	each	actor	is	characterized	by	the	mobilization	of	resources	to	exert	power	over	others.	In	any
organized	action	context,	we	must	obtain	the	contribution	of	others	to	take	actions,	and	the	power	lies	precisely	in	this	ability	to	get	from
others	the	behaviors	whose	we	need	to	act.	The	actor	seeks	to	maintain	or	increase	his	power	in	order	to	get	the	means	to	achieve	his
objectives.
2.5 Finally,	this	sociology	postulates	that	any	organized	action	requires	a	minimum	of	collective	order	that	can	integrate	individual	behaviors	of
actors.	This	order	results	from	the	interdependence	between	the	strategies	of	actors	in	the	exercise	of	their	power	relations.	It	assumes	the
existence	of	a	regulation	process,	even	if	it	remains	more	or	less	precarious	partly	because	of	attempts	by	actors	to	make	it	evolve	to	their
advantage.
2.6 The	concern	of	SOA	is	social	systems	defined	as	"a	complex	set	of	intersected	and	interdependent	games	through	which	persons,	often
provided	with	very	different	assets,	seek	for	maximize	their	gains,	respecting	the	rules	of	the	game	which	are	not	written	and	are	imposed	by
the	environment,	taking	systematically	advantage	of	all	their	assets	and	seeking	to	minimize	those	of	the	others"	(Crozier	1964:	8).	These
intersected	and	interdependent	games	take	place	in	so-called	"Concrete	Systems	of	Action"	which	can	be	defined,	in	a	given	organizational
context,	as	sets	of	actors,	their	alliances,	their	relations	and	the	regularization	of	these	ones.	The	scope	of	SAO	is	therefore	not	limited	to
organizations	structured	by	formal	rules,	but	extends	to	systems	of	actions	regarding,	for	example,	public	policies,	citizen	associations,
collaborations	between	(networks	of)	firms	or	institutions,	partnered	relationships	or	governance	issues.
2.7 "The	central	question	is	to	understand	the	social	processes	leading	to	the	construction	and	organization	of	the	competitive	cooperation
between	a	set	of	actors	who	are	mutually	dependent	for	the	solution	of	a	common	problem,	which	they	cannot	solve	by	themselves	and	for
the	solution	of	which	they	have	to	secure	the	cooperation	of	partners	who	are	also	potential	rivals"	(Friedberg	1997:	122).	Articulating	the
actor	and	the	system,	the	SOA	examines	the	forms	of	cooperation	between	actors	in	contexts	of	action	structured	by	power	relations	and
regulated	by	the	strategic	manipulation	of	these	relations.
2.8 SOA	emphasizes	the	concept	of	power	because	it	underpins	the	regulation	processes	within	organizations.	In	any	system	of	collective	action,
everyone	seeks	to	achieve	his	objectives	and	thus	to	gain	access	to	needed	resources,	including	resources	he	does	not	master	because	they
are	controlled	by	others.	The	access	to	such	resources	is	that	the	SOA	calls	a	"zone	of	uncertainty"	(ZU),	whose	control	enables	an	actor	to
behave	in	a	way	that	is	somehow	unpredictable	by	other	actors	having	a	need	for	these	resources[3].	ZUs	are	the	supports	of	the	power
relationships	between	the	actors,	and	the	power	results	from	the	mastering	of	ZUs:	by	setting	the	"exchange	rules"	in	his	relations	with
others,	the	actor	intends	to	obtain	from	them	a	good	access	to	the	resources	he	needs	himself	[4].	Thus,	power	is	nothing	but	an	indispensable
instrument	to	obtain	from	others	the	means	of	achieving	one's	objectives.	The	regularization	of	the	actors'	behaviors	results	from	an
equilibrium	between	the	steady	pressures	that	they	exercise	the	ones	on	the	others,	since	each	social	actor	both	controls	some	ZUs	and
depends	on	some	others.
A	case	study
2.9 As	an	illustrative	case,	we	will	consider	the	system	of	organized	action	in	charge	of	the	management	of	a	river	called	Touch,	which	is
accurately	documented	(Baldet	2012).	Touch	is	a	tributary	of	the	Garonne	in	which	it	flows	downstream	of	Toulouse,	a	city	of	one	million
inhabitants	in	the	South-West	of	France.	Its	catchment	area	covers	60	municipalities	and	its	75	km	long	course	crosses	29	municipalities.
Upstream,	three	quarters	of	these	municipalities	are	mainly	agricultural	villages	weakly	urbanized.	On	the	contrary,	the	downstream	quarter
of	municipalities	form	a	dense	urban	area	within	the	Toulouse	built-up	area.	Downstream	cities	have	been	reached	by	several	episodes	of
flooding	during	the	past	decades,	and	this	raises	the	question	of	the	prevention	and	management	of	flood	risks.
2.10 Flood	risk	prevention	supposes	cooperation	between	municipalities,	because	of	their	interdependence	within	the	same	watershed.
Downstream	municipalities	are	concerned	with	important	issues	in	terms	of	protecting	people	but	also	in	terms	of	urban	development	and
therefore	economic	activity.	Upstream,	the	main	issue	is	the	use	of	agricultural	land	and	the	preservation	of	village	life.	Each	type	of
municipalities	has	specific	issues	but	they	are	interdependent:	excess	water	must	go	somewhere	and	the	main	way	to	limit	the	damage
caused	by	flooding	downstream	is	to	let	the	upstream	flow	overflow	onto	agricultural	land.	Downstream	municipalities	consider	that	upstream
ones	do	not	cooperate	enough	and	they	have	tried	to	protect	themselves	by	building	dikes	that,	even	if	expensive,	are	not	sufficient	to
eliminate	the	flooding	risk.	On	the	contrary,	upstream	municipalities,	strongly	influenced	by	the	farmers,	consider	that	they	have	taken
responsibility	for	preventing	flooding	by	letting	some	land	lying	uncultivated	to	absorb	the	excess	of	water	in	case	of	flooding.
2.11 The	model	has	been	designed	on	the	occasion	of	enhancing	the	flood	risk	prevention	plan	of	Touch	(FRPP),	an	obligation	of	the	French	law
since	1995	that	was	reinforced,	among	others,	by	the	European	directive	2007/60/CE	relating	to	the	evaluation	and	management	of	flood
risks.
2.12 The	study	of	actor's	representations	and	their	relationships	shows	that	a	"field	flood	risk	"	conception	appeared	in	connection	with	a	change	in
the	orientation	of	the	management	of	Touch	(Baldet	2012).	This	management	has	become	more	global	and	environmental.	The	desire	to
"restore	the	river	to	its	environment",	which	gradually	prevailed,	reflects	the	moving	from	a	hydrological	to	a	hydromorphological	view	of	the
river's	management.	SIAH,	an	inter-communal	association	for	the	management	of	the	river,	brought	this	evolution	[5].	Extending	his	initial
prerogatives,	he	managed	to	lead	an	innovation	process	corresponding	to	a	cognitive	change	from	hydrology	(to	ensure	the	flowing	of	water)
to	hydromorphology	(to	consider	the	river	as	an	element	of	an	ecosystem).
2.13 The	sociology	of	translation	(Callon	1986)	was	used	for	reporting	the	innovation	process.	This	sociology	allows	to	qualitatively	describe	the
process	of	change	by	identifying	the	phases	of	formation	and	consolidation	of	all	the	(human	and	non-human)	"actants"—or	"actor-network"—
bringing	the	change.	In	this	context,	SIAH	is	the	actor	that	problematizes	the	hydromorphological	orientation,	makes	other	to	be	interested	and
enrols	them	to	get	their	mobilization	in	favour	of	change.	The	empirical	study	describes	SIAH	as	the	"obligatory	passage	point"	of	the	actor-
network,	that	is	to	say	the	legitimate	actor	that	controls	and	directs	the	action	of	others	towards	the	promotion	of	the	environmental	view	of	the
river	management.
2.14 Following	the	Lascoumes	and	Le	Bourhis'	approach	(1998),	SIAH	is	also	identified	as	carrying	the	"	Territorial	Public	Interest	".	This	sociology
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studies	the	process	of	building	a	shared	conception	of	the	general	interest	in	a	territory.	It	distinguishes,	among	the	public	policies	conducted
by	the	State,	the	"substantive"	and	the	"procedural"	policies.	In	the	first	case,	the	central	authority	specifically	defines	"the	aims	and	means	of
achieving	them"	on	behalf	of	the	public	interest	previously	established.	In	the	second	case,	which	marks	a	post-bureaucratic	state	action
(Nonet	and	Selznick,	1978),	the	State	simply	produces	"very	general	statements"	and	a	"general	framework"	organizing	the	collective
bargaining	between	local	actors	which	are	thus	led	to	gradually	build	a	"	Territorial	Public	Interest	"	legitimizing	the	decisions.
2.15 If	the	"Actor-Network"	and	"Territorial	Public	Interest"	analysis	schemes	catch	properly	the	cognitive	and	axiological	dimensions	of	change,
they	do	not	put	power	relationships	at	the	heart	of	the	analysis.	We	can	even	consider	they	ignore	this	aspect	of	change	processes	quite
extensively.	It	is	therefore	interesting	to	compare	the	results	obtained	by	these	approaches	with	those	produced	by	an	analysis	in	terms	of
sociology	of	organized	action,	which	provides	an	understanding	of	social	affairs	centred	on	power	as	the	means	necessary	for	action	and	thus
for	change.	Therefore,	one	may	wonder	whether	the	analysis	of	power	relationships	between	actors	of	the	basin	Touch	confirms	or
complements	the	results	described	in	(Baldet	2012).	This	leads	to	formulate	four	hypotheses	(Baldet	and	Roggero	2011)	that	the	SocLab
model	is	intended	to	test:
Hypothesis	1:	To	be	the	obligatory	passage	point	of	the	actor-network,	is	that	SIAH	has	enough	power	to	somehow	constrain
other	actors?
Hypothesis	2:	Purposing	to	play	an	important	role	and	to	introduce	a	change	in	the	management	of	flood	risk,	is	that	SIAH
has	the	means	to	do	so?
Hypothesis	3:	In	the	enrolment	of	other	actors	on	the	service	of	an	hydromorphological	management	of	the	river,	is	that	SIAH
has	powerful	allies?
Hypothesis	4:	Is	that	the	agreement	on	the	"	Territorial	Public	Interest	"	is	confirmed	by	the	absence	of	major	conflicts	in	the
system	of	action?
	The	Meta-model	of	Systems	of	Organized	Action
3.1 Purposing	to	enable	SOA	analysts	to	draw	models	of	organizations,	we	propose	a	meta-model	that	catches	the	main	concepts	and	properties
of	social	organizations	and	can	be	instantiated	on	specific	cases	as	models	of	(the	structure	of)	real	world	social	organizations.	The	model	of
an	organization	is	composed	of	instances	of	the	meta-model's	classes,	which	correspond	to	the	constitutive	elements	of	the	organization
under	consideration,	and	of	links	between	these	instances.	A	preliminary	version	of	this	meta-model	was	presented	in	(Sibertin-Blanc	et	al.
2006).
Figure	1.	The	meta-model	of	the	structure	of	organizations
3.2 The	meta-model	is	represented	graphically	in	Figure	1	as	a	UML	class	diagram,	and	as	an	algebraic	structure	in	Table	3.	Accordingly,	the
structure	of	an	organization	includes	a	set	of	Actors	and	a	set	of	social	Relations	that	are	linked	by	the	Control	and	Depend	associations.	The
actors	are	the	active	entities	who	handle	the	relations.	When	an	actor	acts(),	he	moves()	the	states	of	the	relations	he	controls,	and	he	is	the
only	one	to	be	able	to	do	so.	An	actor	also	depends	on	some	relations,	usually	including	the	ones	he	controls.	He	distributes	stakes	on	each
of	these	relations,	and	the	impact	of	a	relation	upon	an	actor	is	the	value	of	the	effect()	function	applied	to	the	state	of	the	relation	weighted	by
the	stake.	As	a	result,	an	actor	gets	some	capability,	or	action	capacity,	as	an	aggregation	of	the	impacts	that	he	receives	from	the	relations
he	depends	on,	and	he	exerts	some	power,	as	an	aggregation	of	the	impacts	he	grants	to	the	actors	who	depend	on	the	relations	he	controls.
We	now	explain	how	these	elements	are	interpreted	in	the	terms	of	SOA.
Actors	and	their	Stakes
3.3 According	to	SOA,	a	social	actor	is	able	to	negotiate	his	collaboration,	and	this	requires	some	autonomy	with	regard	to	the	control	of	at	least
one	relation.	Therefore	an	actor	is	defined	as	someone	who	controls	at	least	one	relation.	Actors	and	relations	are	defined	in	a	dialogical	way:
something	is	a	relation	if	and	only	if	some	actors	depend	on	it,	and	someone	is	an	actor	if	and	only	if	he	controls	some	relation.	The	actors	of
an	organization	are	either	individual	actors,	either	collective	actors,	i.e.	groups	of	individuals	that	interact	with	others	like	a	single	entity	in	the
considered	context	of	action,	or	plural	actors,	i.e.	populations	of	individuals	that	interact	each	one	on	his	own	but	in	a	similar	way	because
they	are	in	the	same	position,	so	that	their	behaviors	may	be	averaged	and	aggregated	as	the	behavior	of	a	single	population's
representative	actor.
3.4 SOA	assumes	that	the	actors	are	strategic	and	have	an	interested	behavior,	i.e.	"motivated	by	some	goals,	without	defining	these	goals	in
details"	(Friedberg	1997:	214-215).	To	achieve	his	goals,	a	blend	of	his	personal	goals	and	the	ones	related	to	his	interpretation	of	his	role
within	the	organization,	each	actor	needs	resources	which	entail	his	dependence	on	some	relations.	How	much	an	actor	depends	on	a
relation	is	determined	by	the	necessity	of	the	resource	for	the	achievement	of	his	goals	and	the	relative	importance	of	this	goal	(see	Figure	2).
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This	level	of	dependency	is	depicted	by	the	stake	attribute	of	the	depend	association.	More	valuable	is	a	relation	for	an	actor,	higher	is	his
stake	on	this	relation.	Stakes	are	represented	by	numerical	coefficients,	on	an	arbitrary	scale	from	0	to	10:
null	=	0,	negligible	=	1,	…	,	significant	=	5,…	,	critical	=	10.
In	order	to	provide	every	actor	with	the	same	degree	of	investment	in	the	organization,	he	has	a	total	amount	of	10	stake	marks	to	distribute
on	relations.	As	an	actor	cannot	be	indifferent	to	his	own	behavior,	he	should	be	dependent	on	the	relations	he	controls.
3.5 The	SOA	analysis	of	an	organization	focuses	on	what	the	actors	need	to	reach	their	goals	rather	than	on	the	nature	of	these	goals.	SOA	does
not	try	to	analyze	the	world	of	the	goals,	that	are	quite	opaque,	indistinct	and	most	often	incoherent;	it	only	considers	the	actors'	stakes,	that
are	the	projection	of	these	goals	in	the	phenomenological	world	of	the	observable	behaviors.	Under	the	rational	behavior	assumption,	actors
with	different	aims	but	similar	stakes	will	have	similar	social	behaviors[6].
Figure	2.	The	Relations	are	supported	by	mastered	Resources,	stakes	reveal	their	importance	and	necessity	with	regard	to	Goals
The	case
3.6 Within	the	system	of	action	regarding	the	Touch	river,	we	encounter	four	categories	of	actors	which	are	involved	in	the	management	of	the
river	or	have	stakes	in	the	elaboration	or	the	results	of	the	FRPP.	First,	the	population	and	the	local	politicians	of	the	29	municipalities	who
have	to	cope	with	the	constraints	of	the	flood	risks	prevention	and	the	damages	caused	by	flooding.	Second,	State	services	and	river	basin
authorities,	which	are	responsible	for	the	public	good	planning,	namely	the	management	of	water,	and	third,	the	political	authorities	at	the
regional	level,	the	two	latter	being	responsible	for	the	proper	use	of	public	founds.	Forth,	an	engineering	firm	provides	technical	expertise.
This	leads	to	identify	10	actors:
actor	1:	Departmental	Territory	Direction	(DDT)	acts	as	the	State	representative.	It	investigates	and	will	promulgate	the	new	FRPP;
actor	2:	National	Office	for	Water	and	Aquatic	Ecosystem	(ONEMA)	is	the	reference	agency	for	the	knowledge	and	the	monitoring	of
water	and	aquatic	environment.	It	is	also	in	charge,	jointly	with	DDT,	of	the	water	police;
actor	3:	Adour-Garonne	Water	Agency	(AEAG)	is	the	operational	authority	in	charge	of	strategic	River	Basin	Management	Plan.
Accounting	for	the	requirements	of	all	water	uses	and	in	charge	of	the	State	policy	for	the	protection	of	aquatic	ecosystems,	it	defines,
supervises	and	funds	the	water	policy	at	the	basin	level;
actor	4:	a	citizen	organization	of	riparian	farmers	in	the	upstream	area.	They	own	floodplain	lands	and	have	an	excellent	empirical
knowledge	of	issues	related	to	the	river;
actor	5:	the	group	of	25	upstream	towns	that	have	21,000	inhabitants;
actor	6:	the	group	of	4	downstream	towns	(75,000	inhabitants)	that	are	incriminated	at	each	occurrence	of	a	natural	catastrophe.	Due
to	flooding	threats,	they	must	prohibit	any	building	on	a	portion	of	their	territory;
actor	7:	the	inter-communal	association	for	hydraulic	civil	engineering	(SIAH),	in	charge	of	the	management	of	the	Touch,	especially
the	maintenance	of	the	river	bed	and	banks.	It	is	an	arena	both	technical	and	political,	which	includes	representatives	of	the	29
riparian	municipalities.	Its	leader	favors	the	cooperation	among	municipalities	while	worrying	about	the	"good	ecological	status"	of	the
river;
actors	8	and	9:	political	actors,	the	regional	and	departmental	councils	respectively,	which	can	bring	additional	financial	support	to
civil	engineering	measures;
actor	10:	an	engineering	consulting	firm	specialized	in	water,	energy	and	environment	and	entrusted	with	technical	studies.
3.7 The	actors	who	are	the	most	engaged	in	the	negotiation	are	actors	6,	4	and	5	from	the	population	point	of	view,	and	actors	7,	3	and	9	from	the
institutional	point	of	view.	All	these	actors	have	a	significant	interest	in	the	outcome	of	discussions,	while	actors	1,	2,	8	and	10	are	more
peripheral.	There	is	no	noticeable	opposition	between	the	politician	actors	due	to	differences	in	their	political	affiliations.	Each	actor	has	a
variety	of	duties	and	goals	of	its	own.	The	analysis	of	the	debates,	notably	within	the	SIAH,	allows	to	identify	the	actors'	main	objectives,	which
are	all	likely	to	be	prioritized	options	for	managing	the	Touch	river.	They	are	in	the	line	of	the	scene	as	we	presented:
(O1)	protecting	the	downstream	towns	against	floods	without	hindering	their	planning	and	development	(supported	by	actor	6)
(O2)	protecting	the	daily	life	of	upstream	villages,	that	requires	to	protect	agricultural	activities	(supported	by	actors	4	and	5);	
(O3)	ensuring	a	good	ecological	status	of	the	river	and	the	related	aquatic	environment	(supported	by	actors	2	and	3	and	also	7).	
3.8 Upstream	and	downstream	municipalities	are	tightly	interdependent	though	their	respective	interests	are	different,	if	not	conflicting.	So	the
elaboration	of	the	FRPP	includes	a	fourth	issue:
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(O4)	finding	a	solution	that	is	a	compromise	that	is	acceptable	for	the	population	and	its	representatives	(supported	by	actors	7,	3,	1,	8	and	9
by	order	of	importance,	according	to	their	respective	status).	The	fulfillment	of	this	objective	is	essential	because,	whatever	the	chosen
solution,	its	effective	implementation	will	be	problematic	if	it	is	not	agreed	by	most	actors.
Resources,	Relations	and	effect	functions
3.9 Resources	are	whatever	elements	involved	in	actors'	activities	and	whose	availability	is	therefore	necessary	or	somehow	useful	to	achieve
actions	in	the	context	of	the	organization.	They	look	like	concrete	objects,	cognitive	entities	such	as	factual	or	procedural	information,
expectation,	know-how,	services,	attitudes	and	so	on.	Some	resources	are	formal	insofar	as	they	are	associated	with	a	role	of	the
organization,	while	others	are	just	attached	to	an	actor's	specific	way	of	doing.
3.10 Among	the	resources	needed	by	an	actor	to	achieve	his	objectives,	some	ones	are	at	his	free	disposal,	while	others	are	under	the	control	of
another	actor.	There	is	a	social	relation	between	one	actor	who	controls	the	relation	and	one	or	several	others	that	are	dependent	when	they
repeatedly	interact	about	the	access	to	a	resource	(or	a	set	of	related	resources,	see	Figure	2),	and	the	relation	is	the	persistent	matter	of
these	interactions.	A	relation	is	the	playing	of	a	role,	be	it	an	organizational	role	or	a	role	that	an	actor	takes	by	himself.	As	Friedberg	wrote:
"no	power	without	relations,	no	relation	without	exchanges"	(Friedberg	1997:	115).	Power	requires	relations,	relations	imply	exchange,	and
exchange	requires	goods	to	be	exchanged:	the	resources.
3.11 A	relation	refers	to	a	type	of	exchange	involving	the	resource	on	which	it	is	based,	and	this	exchange	is	unbalanced:	an	actor—who	master,
at	least	partially,	the	resource—controls	this	relation,	whereas	some	other	actors—who	need	the	resources	for	achieving	their	goals—are
dependent	on	this	relation.	Thus,	the	actor	who	controls	a	relation	is	in	a	position	to	define	how	the	resource	is	available	to	the	dependent
actors,	and	thereby	he	controls	to	what	extent	they	will	have	the	means	to	reach	their	goals.	A	key	idea	of	SOA	is	that	every	relation	is	an
unbalanced	power	relationship.	But	the	actors	within	an	organization	are	mutually	dependent:	an	actor	a	dominated	by	an	actor	b	in	a	relation
can	dominate	b	in	another	relation,	possibly	via	a	third	actor	c.
3.12 The	state	attribute	of	a	relation	stands	for	the	behavior	of	the	actor	who	controls	the	relation,	i.e.	his	policy	with	regard	to	the	access	to	the
underlying	resource.	Its	value	ranges	over	a	space	of	behaviors,	representing	the	set	of	all	the	behaviors	that	the	actor	can	adopt	in	the
management	of	the	relation	on	a	scale	of	cooperativity.	In	order	to	keep	it	simple,	the	space	of	behaviors	of	each	relation	is	formalized	as	an
arbitrary	interval	SB	=	[-10;	10],	where	the	bounds	stand	for	the	technical	or	practical	feasibility	limits,	according	to	the	very	nature	of	the
underlying	resource.	This	interval	is	oriented:	the	lower	bound	represents	the	least	cooperative	behaviors,	the	upper	bound	represents	the
most	cooperative	behaviors,	while	the	zero	value	stands	for	neutral	behaviors	that	comply	with	the	norms	and	may	be	qualified	neither	as
cooperative	nor	as	uncooperative.
3.13 Friedberg	defines	the	power	as	"the	capacity	to	structure	the	negotiated	behavior	exchange	in	one's	favor"	(Friedberg	1997:	113),	i.e.	to
obtain	favorable	behaviors.	The	actor	who	controls	a	relation	may	change	his	behavior	by	using	the	function	move(),	that	modifies	the	value	of
the	state	of	the	relation.	The	SOA	does	not	consider	how	actors	adjust	their	behaviors	one	to	another	within	an	organization,	it	just	spots	the
current	behaviors.	We	made	the	assumption	that	an	actor	adjusts	his	behavior	by	a	greater	or	lower	cooperation	with	regard	to	his	actual
behavior.
3.14 The	state	of	a	relation—that	is	the	behavior	of	its	controller	actor—has	an	effect	upon	each	actor	who	depends	on	this	relation:	for	each
depending	actor,	the	state	determines	the	availability	of	the	underlying	resource	and	to	what	extent	the	actor	is	granted	to	use	the	resource
according	to	his	goals.	The	effects	take	values	on	a	bipolar	arbitrary[7]	scale	from	-10	to	10	measuring	a	capacity	of	action:
worst	access	=-10,	strongly	prevented	=	-8,	…,	neutral	=0,	…,	good	=6,…,	optimal	=10.
Higher	is	the	effect	of	a	relation	on	an	actor,	more	usable	is	the	resource	for	his	desires,	and	therefore	larger	is	his	capability	to	realize	his
aims.	Depending	on	the	very	nature	of	a	relation	and	the	specific	needs	of	an	actor,	the	link	between	the	state	and	the	effect	is	given	by	an
effect()	function.	When	the	controller	of	a	relation	r	chooses	a	state	value	s	in	the	space	of	behaviors	of	the	relation,	the	effect	on	a	dependent
actor	a	is	given	by	effectr(a,	s).	More	formally,	the	effectr()	function	of	a	relation	r	is	defined	as:	
effectr	:	A	×	SBr	→	[-10,	10],
where	A	is	the	set	of	actors,	SBr	the	space	of	behaviors	of	relation	r	and	[-10,	10]	the	range	of	the	capability	to	use	a	resource.
The	case
3.15 The	model	is	designed	in	such	a	way	that	each	actor	controls	a	single	relation	that	summarizes	his	means	to	influence	or	carry	out	the
management	policy	of	the	river.	(For	space	limitation,	we	can	not	bring	all	the	empirical	arguments	in	favour	of	this	model,	but	see	Sibertin-
Blanc	et	al.	(2013b)	for	details).
Validation	(between	-10	and	10)	is	the	more	or	less	harsh	regard	of	actor	1	on	the	prevention	plan	proposed	by	actor	7.	This
validation	is	made	on	the	basis	of	technical	and	ecological	criteria;
Expertise	(between	-8	and	8)	is	the	outcome	of	a	study	of	which	actor	2	is	in	charge.	Actor	2	gives	a	positive	or	negative	appraisal	on
the	construction	work,	based	mostly	on	ecological	criteria;
Funding	(between	-8	and	8)	is	a	funding	coming	from	actor	3	who	can	pay	for	up	to	75%	of	the	total	cost	of	a	construction	work	if	the
project	is	considered	as	ecological;
Lobbying	(between	-10	and	10)	is	the	more	or	less	dynamic	and	efficient	activity	of	actor	4	who	owns	the	floodplain	lands.	As	this
actor	is	not	much	concerned	by	ecological	issues,	he	is	frequently	arguing	against	actors	2	and	3;
Control	of	flow	(between	-8	and	8)	is	the	capability	of	upstream	villages	(actor	5)	to	keep	(positive	values	of	the	state)	in	their	territory
a	part	of	the	water	that	floods	the	downstream	towns;
Self	funding	(between	-8	and	8)	is	the	propensity	of	downstream	towns	(actor	6)	to	realize	civil	engineering	works	and	engage	in
SIAH;	negative	values	correspond	to	focusing	on	protection	of	the	town	against	flood	and	denigrating	the	efficiency	of	SIAH;	positive
values	correspond	to	engaging	in	SIAH	while	denouncing	the	selfishness	of	upstream	towns.
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/16/4/8.html 6 15/10/2015
River	management	(between	-8	and	8)	is	the	activity	of	actor	7	on	the	river	management:	low	values	of	the	state	mean	that	the
association	limits	his	involvement	to	legal	competence,s	i.e.	river	maintenance,	and	high	values	mean	that	the	association	engages	in
the	prevention	of	threats	coming	from	the	river;
Additional	funding	RC	(between	-8	and	8)	is	the	financial	involvement	of	actor	8	in	the	project;
Additional	funding	DC	(between	-8	and	8)	is	the	financial	involvement	of	actor	9	in	the	project:	actor	9	has	his	own	rules	to	give	a
project	financial	assistance.	A	high	level	for	this	relation	means	stronger	(mainly	ecological)	constraints	to	grant	the	project;
Studies	(between	-8	and	8)	is	a	study	conducted	by	actor	10:	a	positive	value	means	an	hydromorphological	outcome	for	this	study
(ecological	approach	that	uses	the	shape	of	the	river	to	prevent	flooding)	and	a	negative	value	means	an	hydraulic	outcome	for	this
study	(e.g.	dikes	and	dams,	without	consideration	for	the	natural	course	of	the	river).
3.16 Table	1	shows	the	stakes	that	actors	(in	column)	put	on	the	relations.	Actors	disperse	their	stakes	in	very	different	ways,	from	5	relations
(actors	6	and	10)	to	8	relations	(actors	2	and	3).	Each	actor	put	about	one	third	of	his	stakes	on	the	relation	he	controls.	The	River
management	is	clearly	the	most	relevant	relation	since	it	collects	21	stake	points,	while	relations	Expertise,	Additional	funding	and	Studies
gather	about	5	stake	points	each.
3.17 As	an	example,	we	comment	the	SIAH's	stakes.	His	capacity	for	action	depends	on	the	behavior	of	the	water	agency	(actor	3)	that	finances	its
operation	and	most	of	the	works	of	the	river	development.	Its	capacity	also	depends	on	the	behaviors	of	the	upstream	and	downstream
municipalities	and	citizen	associations	(actors	5,	6	and	4)	since	their	cooperation	is	necessary	for	a	management	of	the	river	that	is	efficient
and	in	accordance	with	the	SIAH's	convictions.	To	a	lesser	extent,	SIAH	also	depends	on	the	interpretation	of	legal	constraints	by	the	State
services,	i.e.	the	DDT.
Table	1:	The	stakes	of	the	actors	on	the	relations
1.
DDT
2.
ONEMA
3.
AEAG
4.
Riparian
Farmers
5.
Upstream
towns
6.
Downstr.
towns
7.
SIAH
8.
Regional
Council
9.
Depart.
Council
10.
Engineering
Firm
Validation 4.0 2.0 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 2.0 1.5
Expertise 1.0 3.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
Funding 1.0 1.5 4.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 0.0
Lobbying 0.5 0.0 1.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0
Control	of	flow 0.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 1.5
Self	funding 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.5 4.0 2.0 0.5 0.5 0.0
River
management
2.0 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.5 2.0
Add.	funding
CR
0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.5 0.0
Add.	funding
DR
0.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.0 0.0
Studies 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0
3.18 Table	2	shows	the	shape	of	the	effect	functions.	These	functions	are	linear,	quadratic	or	sigmoid.	Each	row	in	the	table	shows	the	effect	of	the
state	of	the	relation	on	each	actor	(in	columns).	Since	each	actor	controls	one	relation,	the	diagonal	contains	the	effect	function	of	each
relation	on	its	controller	actor.	This	function	is	particularly	significant	firstly	because	it	is	generally	subject	to	an	important	stake	and	secondly
because	it	is	indicative	of	the	actor's	whishes	and	how	much	he	feels	pleased	by	the	achievement	of	his	aims.	We	only	comment	the
functions	of	the	relation	River	management	controlled	by	SIAH.
3.19 The	range	of	the	state	is	reduced	to	[-8,	+8]	to	take	account	of	institutional	constraints	on	SIAH	because	of	his	status.	(Enlarging	this	range
would	generate	another	model	enabling	SIAH	to	override	these	constraints).	SIAH	is	legally	responsible	for	the	maintenance	of	the	river,	but
his	activist	technical	manager	aspires	to	play	a	role	in	the	management	of	flood	risks	based	on	a	hydromorphological	conception	of	the	river.
The	shape	of	the	effect	function	on	SIAH	expresses	this	orientation.	Negative	values	of	the	state	(along	the	x-axis)	correspond	to	situations
where	SIAH	remains	within	the	narrow	framework	of	its	mandated	role	and	the	hydrologic	conception	associated	with	it.	They	provide	SIAH
with	a	negative	satisfaction	(along	the	y-axis).	More	SIAH	implements	his	hydromorphological	conception	and	participates	in	the	management
of	flood	risk,	more	he	becomes	satisfied.	The	inflection	points	of	the	curve	correspond	to	thresholds.	Above	-4,	the	statutory	role	of	SIAH
begins	to	be	enough	overcome	to	have	an	increasing	effect.	Similarly,	the	value	+4	is	the	threshold	where	the	excess	of	his	assigned	role
begins	to	cause	difficulties	with	other	actors.
3.20 The	effect	functions	of	the	River	management	relation	on	upstream	and	downstream	towns	have	profiles	partially	opposed	to	that	of	SIAH.
When	SIAH	keeps	the	role	of	maintenance	manager,	the	former	are	quite	satisfied,	but	moderately	as	the	SIAH	imposes	maintenance
constraints.	When	SIAH	gets	out	of	this	role,	initially	they	are	more	satisfied	but	they	become	less	satisfied	when	SIAH	begins	to	exert	an
influence	limiting	their	prerogatives	in	the	planning	of	their	territory.	Downstream	municipalities	have	more	resources	than	the	upstream	ones
to	perform	the	required	work.	Their	satisfaction	will	be	positive	until	SIAH	takes	too	much	power	on	their	territory.
3.21 The	effect	functions	on	other	actors	operate	in	the	same	direction	as	SIAH.	They	are	therefore	rather	favorable	to	an	extension	of	the	role	of
the	inter-communal	association.	DDT	is	in	favor	that	SIAH	takes	better	care	of	risk	management,	which	would	facilitate	the	work	of
investigating	the	case.	ONEMA	sees	a	convergence	with	his	own	environmental	orientations.	For	AEAG,	the	convergence	is	even	more
accentuated	because	a	greater	role	SIAH	is	consistent	both	with	his	environmental	preferences	and	an	increase	in	his	own	influence	through
SIAH's	policy.	The	Riparian	Farmers	are	also	pleased	by	an	expanded	role	for	SIAH.	This	enhances	their	ability	to	influence,	due	to	the	good
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relationships	of	the	leaders	of	the	association	with	the	technical	team	of	SIAH	(they	share	a	concrete	empirical	knowledge	of	the	river).
3.22 Funders	such	as	CR	and	CG	are	also	in	favor	of	increasing	the	role	of	SIAH	in	the	field	of	flood	risk	management.	For	these	institutions,	to
have	a	single	contact	would	be	a	facilitation	of	their	work.	Finally,	the	Engineering	Firm	prefers	a	risk	manager,	because	he	could	therefore	be
asked	for	more	studies.
Table	2.	The	effect	functions	of	the	relations	on	the	actors.	The	x-axis	corresponds	to	the	state	of	the	relation,	the	y-axis	corresponds	to	the
resulting	capability	for	the	actor.
States	of	an	Organization,	Action	Capacity	and	Power	of	Actors
3.23 We	define	a	state	of	the	organization,	or	one	of	its	possible	configurations,	as	a	vector	of	all	the	relations'	states.	For	each	actor	and	each
relation	he	depends	on,	we	define	the	relation's	impact	as	its	effect	weighted	by	the	actor's	stake.	To	the	extent	that	relations'	impacts	are
commensurable,	the	aggregation	of	the	impacts	received	by	an	actor	depicts	his	overall	ability	to	access	the	resources	he	needs	to	reach	his
goals,	weighted	by	the	relative	importance	of	these	resources.	It	measures	the	actor's	capability	to	reach	his	goals,	by	having	the	means
required	to	this	end.	Under	the	hypothesis	that	there	are	no	interferences	between	resource	uses	(Cf.	4.12	below),	it	is	possible	to	sum	the
impacts	and	to	define	the	capability	of	an	actor	a,	when	the	organization	is	in	the	state	s,	as:
capability(a,	s)	=	Σr	∈	R	stake(a,	r)	*	effectr(a,	sr)	=	Σr	∈	R	 impact(r,	a,	sr), (1)
where	stake(a,	r)	is	the	stake	of	a	on	relation	r	and	effectr(a,	sr)	is	the	effect	on	a	of	relation	r	being	in	the	state	sr.
3.24 By	his	control	on	some	relations,	each	actor	contributes	to	the	capability	of	actors	who	depend	on	these	relations.	The	whole	influence	of	an
actor	on	the	capability	of	others,	i.e.	to	what	extent	his	behavior	contributes	to	their	ability	to	reach	their	goals,	fits	the	concept	of	power,	a	core
concept	in	SOA.	The	power	exerted	by	an	actor	a	upon	an	actor	b	when	the	organization	is	in	the	state	s	is	thus	defined	by:
power(a,	b,	s)	=	Σr	∈	R;	a	controls	r	stake(a,	r)	*	|effectr(a,	sr)|	[8] (2)
3.25 The	definition	of	the	meta-model	of	organizations	as	a	UML	class	diagram	as	in	Figure	1	provides	a	graphical	representation	that	is	easy	to
understand.	However,	we	may	also	define	the	model	of	an	organization	as	an	algebraic	structure,	as	given	in	Table	3.
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Table	3.	The	algebraic	definition	of	organizations'	models
The	model	of	an	organization	is	a	finite	structure	including:
A	the	set	of	actors;
R	the	set	of	relations;
control	:	R	→	A;	control(r)	is	said	to	be	the	controller	actor	of	relation	r;
state	:	R	→	SBr,	where	SBr	is	the	additive	Space	of	Behaviors	of	relation	r;	state(r)	evaluates	the	cooperativity	of	the	actor	control(r)
and	we	put	SBr	=	[-10,	10]	for	any	relation	r	without	loss	of	generality;
stake	:	A	×	R	→	[0,	10]	such	as	∀	a	∈	A	Σr	∈	R	stake(a,	r)	=10;	an	actor	a	is	said	to	be	dependent	on	relation	r	iff	stake(a,	r)	≠	0;
effect	:	R	→	(A	×	SBr→	AC),	where	AC	is	the	range	of	value	of	action	capacities;	we	put	AC	=	[-10,	10]	without	loss	of	generality	and
assume	that	actions	capacities	may	be	added	and	multiplied	by	coefficients	(stakes	and	solidarities).
The	Social	Game
3.26 Such	an	interaction	setting	defines	a	social	game.	According	to	SOA,	the	regula(riza)tion	of	an	organization	results	from	the	intentionality	of
actors'	behaviors.	Actors	are	strategic;	each	one	seeks,	as	a	meta-objective,	to	obtain	from	others	a	satisfying	level	of	capability	and	to	this
end	adjusts	the	state	of	the	relations	he	controls.	Doing	so,	he	modifies	the	capability	of	every	actor	depending	on	the	relations	he	controls,
including	himself.	More	precisely,	at	each	step	of	the	game,	every	actor	moves	the	values	of	the	states	of	the	relations	he	controls,	and	this
change	of	the	game's	state	modifies	the	capability	of	other	actors.	Let	(sr1,	…	,	srm)	be	a	state	of	the	organization	and	(cr1,	…,	crm)	be	moves
such	that	(cr	+	sr)	SBr	and	cr	is	chosen	by	actor	a	=	control(r).	Once	each	actor	has	chosen	such	an	action,	the	game	goes	to	a	new	state
defined	by:
						Transition:	[	-10;	10]	m	×	[	-10;	10]	m	→	[	-10;	10]	m
such	as
						Transition((sr1,	…	,	srm),	(cr1,	…	,	crm))	=	(sr1	+	cr1,	…	,	srm	+	crm).
(3)
3.27 The	game	ends	when	a	stationary	state	is	reached.	In	such	a	state,	each	actor	no	longer	modifies	his	behavior	because	he	is	satisfied	by	the
level	of	capability	he	actually	obtains.	Therefore,	the	organization	is	regulated	and	can	operate	in	this	way.
3.28 The	social	game	is	a	game	in	the	sense	of	Morgenstern	et	al.	(1953),	where	the	capability	of	an	actor	serves	as	utility	function.	However,	it
differs	from	games	that	are	considered	in	economics:	the	social	game	does	not	worry	about	the	amount	of	capability	gained	by	the	actors,	but
about	the	possibility	for	the	game	to	exist	thanks	to	the	persistency	of	the	organization's	concrete	existence.	In	the	section	6,	we	will	consider
the	implementation	of	the	model	of	an	organization	as	a	multi-agents	system	that	makes	the	organization's	actors	to	play	the	social	game	and
so	compute	how	it	could	be	regulated.
Some	Extensions	of	the	Meta-model	of	Organizations
4.1 The	elements	presented	in	the	previous	section	catch	the	underpinning	concepts	of	SOA.	We	now	introduce	complementary	elements	which
extend	its	somehow	simplistic	view.	They	allow	to	develop	more	accurate	models	and	lead	to	the	meta-model	of	organizations	shown	in
Figure	3.
Figure	3.	The	extended	meta-model	of	organizations'	structure
Solidarities	between	Actors:	Satisfaction	and	Influence
4.2 The	interactions	among	the	actors	of	an	organization	are	not	totally	shaped	by	relations	underpinned	on	the	need	and	the	control	of
resources.	There	are	links	tied	inside	the	organization	such	as	esteem	or	the	recognition	of	shared	(or	opposite)	interests	that	would	be
artificially	represented	by	resources	of	the	organization,	while	they	clearly	affect	the	actors'	behaviors.	The	same	holds	for	the	charismatic
and	traditional	types	of	authority	as	opposed	to	rational-legal	authority	(Weber	1958).	There	are	also	links	outside	the	organization	that
influence	the	way	actors	consider	each	other	such	as	kinship	links,	common	social	condition	or	scholarship,	common	membership	to	another
organization	and	so	on.
4.3 That	led	us	to	introduce	the	solidarities	that	actors	maintain	between	them	to	model	how	they	account	each	other.	Solidarities	are
represented	by	a	function	which	measures	the	degree	of	solidarity	solidarity(a,	b)	that	an	actor	a	puts	on	an	actor	b:
solidarity:	A	×	A	→	[-1,	1]	such	that	∀	a	∈	A	solidarity(a,	a)	=	1[9], (4)
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where	negative	values	represent	hostility,	zero	represents	lack	of	concern,	and	positive	values	represents	real	solidarity.
The	case
4.4 Table	4	shows	how	much	each	actor	(in	line)	is	solidary	with	some	others	(in	columns).	One	may	notice	that	hostilities	mainly	concern
Riparian	Farmers,	Upstream	and	Downstream	towns,	that	is	the	field	actors	that	are	directly	concerned	by	floods.	We	will	explain	in	the
following	section	how	actors'	solidarities	are	measured,	but	one	may	also	notice	that	AEAG	and	SIAH	are	the	target	of	high	solidarities	(1.7
and	1.5),	as	a	sign	of	the	expectations	from	the	other	actors	about	them.
Table	4:	Solidarities	between	the	actors	of	the	Touch's	system	of	organized	action
DDT ONEMA AEAG Riparian
Farmers
Upstream
towns
Downstr.
towns
SIAH Regional
Council
Depart.
Council
Engineering
Firm
DDT 0.6 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
ONEMA 0.05 0.6 0.15 -0.05 0.05 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
AEAG 0.05 0.1 0.7 -0.05 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Riparian	Farmers 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 -0.1 0.05 0.0 0.0 0.0
Upstream	towns 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.7 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Downstream	towns 0.1 0.15 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.05
SIAH 0.1 0.0 0.05 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.65 0.0 0.0 0.0
Regional	Council 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.05 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0
Departmental	Council 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.0
Engineering	Firm 0.0 0.1 0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.7
4.5 The	introduction	of	solidarities	leads	to	consider	two	quantities,	in	addition	to	the	capability	and	power,	to	characterize	a	social	configuration:
Satisfaction	and	Influence.	When	an	organization	is	in	a	state	s,	the	satisfaction	perceived	by	an	actor	a	is	the	sum	of	the	capabilities	of	all	the
actors	weighted	by	his	solidarities	for	them:
satisfaction(a,	s)	=	Σb	∈	A	solidarity(a,	b)	*	capability(b,	s). (5)
4.6 The	capability	of	an	actor	evaluates	his	effective	freedom	of	action,	while	his	satisfaction	corresponds	to	the	representation	that	guides	his
behavior.	In	the	reverse	way,	we	redefine	the	power	exerted	by	an	actor	a	on	another	actor	b	as	the	sum	of	the	impacts	of	the	relations
controlled	by	a	weighted	by	the	solidarities	of	b:
power(a,	b,	s)	=	Σc	∈	A	solidarity(b,	c)	*	influence(a,	c,	s), (6)
where	influence(a,	c,	s)	=	Σr	∈	R;	a	controls	r	stake(a,	r)	*	|effectr(a,	sr)|.
Bounds	of	the	Spaces	of	Behaviors	of	Relations
4.7 The	actor	who	controls	a	relation	can	not	assign	whatever	value	to	the	state	of	this	relation,	due	to	the	cultural	dimension	of	the	organization
(Schein	1985),	social	norms	or	rules	imposed	by	a	legitimate	authority	that	set	boundaries	whose	crossing	can	not	be	the	subject	of
negotiations.	He	has	to	abide	norms	of	the	social	game	and	they	restrict	the	set	of	behaviors	that	he	is	allowed	to	adopt.	These	social
constraints	may	be	represented	by	associating	to	each	relation	two	attributes
b_minr	and	b_maxr,	where	-10	≤	b_minr	≤	b_maxr	≤	10[10]. (7)
4.8 Therefore,	the	[b_minr,	b_maxr]	interval	models	the	real	room	to	manœuvre	of	the	actor	who	controls	the	relation	r	and	quantity	(b_maxr	-
b_minr)	measures	the	extent	of	his	leeway.	Distinguishing	the	social	limitations	from	the	ones	imposed	by	the	nature	of	resources	will	allow	to
examine	what	happens	when	social	norms	are	overpassed,	one	of	the	tricks	of	organizational	change.	It	also	allows	to	consider	constraints
among	relations.
Constraints	among	Relations
4.9 The	paradigmatic	case	of	SOA,	i.e.	the	"industrial	monopoly"	(Crozier	1964:	67-174	and	186-214),	includes	a	relation	concerning	the
"maintenance	of	the	machines"	that	is	controlled	by	the	"maintenance	workers"	and	another	relation	concerning	the	"contribution	to	the
production"	controlled	by	the	"production	workers".	It	is	clear	that	the	proper	working	of	the	machines	determines	to	what	extent	they	can	be
used	by	the	production	workers	and	thus	their	possibility	to	put	a	lot	into	their	work.	Thus,	the	model	must	account	the	fact	that	a	bad
maintenance	of	the	machines	prevents	a	high	contribution	by	the	production	workers	and	thus	decreases	the	b_max	bound	of	the	contribution
to	the	production.
4.10 This	can	be	expressed	by	constraints	that	the	state	of	a	relation	imposes	on	the	bounds	of	the	space	of	behaviors	of	another	relation	by	the
two	following	functions	on_bminr,	r'	:	SBr	→	SBr'	and	on_bmaxr,	r'	:	SBr	→	SBr'	such	that
on_bminr,	r'(sr)	≤	on_bmaxr,	r'	(sr), (8)
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and	for	any	configuration	where	relations	r	and	r'	are	in	states	sr	and	sr'
maxr	;	r	constraint	r' 	{on_bminr,	r'(sr)}	≤	sr'	≤	minr	;	r	constraint	r' 	{on_bmaxr,	r'(sr)}[11]. (9)
The	case
4.11 Our	case	includes	no	constraints	between	relations,	each	actor	being	relatively	autonomous	in	the	conduct	of	his	policy.	Certainly,	the
behavior	of	Upstream	towns	can	prevent	Downstream	towns	to	intensify	his	development	strategy,	but	this	aspect	is	not	included	in	the	Self
funding	relation.
Interactions	among	the	Effects	of	Relations
4.12 The	capability	of	an	actor	is	computed	by	summing	the	impacts	of	the	relations	he	depends	on.	This	way	of	aggregating	impacts	of	relations
assumes	that	their	effects	are	independent	and	it	makes	impossible	to	express,	for	example,	that	two	relations	are	redundant	(a	good	effect
from	only	one	of	the	two	relations	is	sufficient)	or	complementary	(a	good	effect	from	one	of	them	is	useless	without	a	good	effect	from	the
other).	This	is	a	matter	of	preference	aggregation,	a	well-known	issue	in	the	field	of	decision-making	(Labreuche	and	Grabisch	2007).
4.13 Instead	of	looking	for	a	complex	aggregation	function	such	as	the	Choquet	or	Sugeno	integrals	(Dubois	et	al.	2001;	Labreuche	and	Grabisch
2006),	we	propose	to	consider,	in	addition	to	the	elementary	relations	whose	state	is	controlled	by	an	actor,	compound	relations	whose	state
is	defined	by	a	function	that	aggregates	the	states	of	its	component	relations	according	to	the	nature	of	the	interaction	(cf.	Figure	4).	For
example,	if	two	relations	r1	and	r2	are	redundant	for	an	actor,	he	will	not	put	stakes	on	the	r1	and	r2	relations	but	upon	a	new	compound
relation	r	such	that	r.state	=	max{r1.state,	r2.state}.
Figure	4.	Dealing	with	dependencies	among	the	effects	of	relations	for	an	actor
4.14 In	some	case,	it	is	irrelevant	to	aggregate	the	relations'	impacts	because	they	are	not	commensurable,	for	instance	whether	positive	impacts
do	not	compensate	negative	ones	due	to	the	actor's	risk	aversion.	In	such	cases,	the	actors'	capabilities	and	satisfactions	are	defined	as
vectors	of	impacts,	each	component	corresponding	to	the	capability	to	reach	one	of	the	actor's	goals.
4.15 Many	other	extensions	of	the	meta-model	could	be	defined,	such	that	the	shared	control	of	a	relation	by	several	actors	or	the	fact	that	the
control	of	a	relation	can	be	exerted	only	in	particular	configurations.
Modeling	a	System	of	Organized	Action
5.1 The	meta-model	presented	in	the	previous	sections	is	a	tool	that	shapes	models	of	organizations,	so	it	needs	a	"user	manual"	to	guide	the
production	of	the	pieces	of	models.	After	an	overview	of	a	methodology	for	the	design	of	such	model,	we	provide	pragmatic	hints	for	dealing
with	common	organizational	patterns.
A	Methodology	for	the	Design	of	SocLab	Models
5.2 The	pieces	of	the	model	of	an	action	system	are	the	following:
1.	 the	list	of	actors;
2.	 the	list	of	relations	with	their	controller	actor;
3.	 the	stake	of	actors	on	relations;
4.	 the	interpretation	of	states	of	each	relation	in	terms	of	behaviours	of	its	controller	actor,
5.	 the	effect	functions;
6.	 the	constraints	between	relations;
7.	 the	solidarity	between	actors.
5.3 The	sociologist	may	elaborate	a	model	in	a	purely	analytical	way,	on	the	basis	of	his	own	understanding	of	the	phenomena	in	play.	However,
most	sociologists	enjoin	to	underpin	models	on	qualitative	interviews	purposing	to	catch	the	subjective	representation	of	the	actors	and
stakeholders	of	the	phenomena	under	consideration.	In	that	regard,	the	peculiarity	of	our	meta-model	is	to	require	an	amount	of	quantitative
data	on	individuals.	It	falls	neither	within	quantitative	approaches,	which	are	mainly	based	on	the	collection	of	statistics	nor	within	qualitative
approaches	that	produces	discursive	analysis	of	phenomena	under	consideration.	Therefore	it	requires	an	appropriate	methodology	that
ensures	the	practical	feasibility	of	the	integration	between	qualitative	interviews	and	formal	modelling	and	so	the	design	of	faithful	models.	So
we	will	provide	hints	on	a	methodology	to	produce	the	above	mentioned	pieces	of	a	model.
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5.4 The	first	step	is	the	identification	of	the	relevant	actors	(1),	that	is	the	persons,	individuals	or	collectives	who	take	part	to	the	system's	activity
and	whose	behaviour	has	a	significant	effect	on	the	relevant	properties	of	the	system's	functioning.	The	identification	of	actors	goes	hand	in
hand	with	the	identification	of	resources	mobilized	in	collective	action,	material	and	cognitive	entities	(data,	knowledge,	expertise,
expectations,	attitude,	…)	which	are	handled	by	the	actors	in	their	actions	and	interactions;	this	provides	the	basis	for	(2).	This	exploratory
step	is	common	to	all	sociological	review	in	the	field	and	it	has	nothing	specific.
5.5 Table	5	shows	the	form	that	can	be	used	to	collect	the	data	needed	for	the	characterisation	of	each	relation	(3),	(4)	and	(5).	Experiments	tend
to	show	that	organization's	members	have	no	difficulty	to	provide	answers	that	are	clear	and	reliable	enough	to	fill	these	forms	(Adreit	et	al.
2011).
5.6 For	each	relation,	the	consistency	of	the	answers	on	the	one	hand	of	the	controller	actor	and	on	the	other	hand	the	dependent	actors	must	be
carefully	checked,	to	ensure	that	there	is	no	ambiguity	on	the	substance	of	the	relation.	For	the	actors	corresponding	to	a	collective	or
population,	a	few	individuals	will	be	interviewed,	as	representative	as	possible	of	this	group	or	population	and	their	answers	should	be
summarized	into	a	single	form.	The	construction	of	a	consistent	model	most	often	leads	to	a	second	interview	with	some	people	to	clarify
certain	points.	Notably,	it	can	be	necessary	to	come	back	to	the	controller	of	a	relation	after	the	interviews	of	the	persons	who	depend	on	him.
In	the	course	of	the	investigation	process,	it	can	happen	that	an	actor	is	not	so	influential	as	expected	and	can	be	put	away	from	the	model,
while	a	person	seemingly	marginal	reveals	to	play	a	significant	role	and	must	be	considered	as	an	actor	in	the	model.
5.7 Questions	1	and	2	in	Table	5	purpose	to	set	the	list	of	relations,	who	controls	and	who	depends	on	each	relation	and	thus	to	finalise	(2).	(Note
that,	to	remain	in	the	domain	of	the	facts,	it	can	be	better	to	speak	of	'resource'	rather	than	'relation'	with	the	interviewee).	Thanks	to	the
knowledge	of	the	organization	acquired	during	the	initialisation	step	and	the	previous	interviews,	the	sociologist	can	help	the	interviewed
person	to	clearly	delineate	the	relation	in	question.	The	interviewer	and	the	interviewee	must	be	as	clear	as	possible	on	what	they	are	talking
about.
5.8 Question	3	enables	to	determine	the	stakes	of	the	interviewee	on	the	relations	he	depends	on	(3).	People	are	used	to	quantify	the	importance
of	something	on	a	scale	of	0	to	10	and	this	question	is	not	difficult	to	answer.	The	values	given	are	normalized	so	that	their	sum	is	equal	to	10.
This	process	ensures	that	the	model	reflects	the	relative	importance	of	each	relation	for	the	actor	(remember	that	the	range	of	value	of	stakes
is	arbitrary,	only	the	proportion	between	stakes	matters).
5.9 Questions	4,	6	and	8	are	intended	to	characterize	the	range	of	possible	behaviors	of	the	actor	who	controls	the	relation	and	therefore	to
calibrate	the	range	of	its	state	(4).	According	to	SOA,	actors	exchange	behaviours	and	the	range	of	the	controller	actor's	behaviors	is	what
characterizes	a	relation.	Therefore,	the	answers	of	all	actors	who	depend	on	a	relation	(including	the	controller	actor)	need	to	be	reconciled
into	a	careful	description	of	these	behaviors.
5.10 The	answers	to	questions	4,	6	and	8	describe	respectively	the	behaviors	associated	with	the	values	-10	(worst	case),	10	(best	case)	and	0
(neutral	case)	of	the	relation's	state.	It	may	happen	that	good	behaviors	for	some	dependent	actors	are	bad	for	others	and	conversely,
because	the	actions	of	the	controller	actor	have	opposite	effects	on	them.	Then,	the	sociologist	must	align	the	good	/	bad	appraisals	into	the
most	relevant	orientation	of	the	-10	…	10	range	of	value.	It	will	be	up	to	the	sociologist	to	make	interpolations	to	associate	a	negative	value	of
the	state	with	an	intermediate	behavior	between	responses	to	questions	4	and	8	and	a	positive	value	with	a	behavior	between	responses	to
questions	4	and	8.
5.11 As	for	the	answer	to	question	10,	it	is	intended	to	position	the	actual	configuration	of	the	action	system	within	this	scale	of	value.	Once	again,
for	each	relation	a	single	(approximate)	value	is	needed	and	the	very	nature	of	the	relation	should	be	reconsidered	if	the	actors'	answers	are
not	compatible,	unless	specific	explanations	justify	to	dismiss	divergent	views.	It	is	expected	that	this	configuration	will	be	compatible	with	the
simulation	results.
5.12 Questions	5,	7	and	9	are	used	to	shape	the	effect	functions	(5)	of	the	interviewed	actor.	They	gives	the	y-coordinate	value	of	the	points	of
abscissa	-10,	10	and	0	respectively.	Thus,	the	sociologist	has	three	points	to	define	the	effect	function,	and	it	is	up	to	his	understanding	of	the
nature	of	the	relation	and	the	actor's	sensitivity	to	complete	the	shape	of	the	curve.	The	question	11	is	intended	to	provide	a	forth	point	on	the
curve,	as	an	auxiliary	data.
5.13 There	is	no	systematic	question	about	possible	constraints	between	relations	(6),	because	there	is	a	huge	variety	of	cases	depending	on	the
peculiarities	of	each	concrete	relation.	Thus,	generic	questions	would	be	quite	abstract	and	difficult	to	understand	by	interviewees.	Thanks	to
his	knowledge	of	the	whole	system	of	action,	the	sociologist	should	be	able	to	analyze	the	interferences	between	relations,	to	infer	constraints
to	introduce	into	the	model	and	to	ask	questions	allowing	to	confirm	his	hypotheses.
5.14 The	last	question	12	is	about	the	interviewed	actor's	solidarities,	i.e.	the	other	actors	who	matter	to	him	whether	he	wants	or	he	fears	their
success.	Processing	in	the	same	way	as	for	stakes,	data	can	be	collected	by	asking	the	person	to	quantify	his	degrees	of	commitment	on	a
scale	0	to	10	for	positive	solidarity	and	a	scale	0	to	-10	for	hostilities.	Then	these	values	are	normalized	by	giving	the	actor	a	solidarity	of	10	or
15	with	himself.
Table	5:	Form	for	the	collection	of	the	data	needed	to	quantify	a	SocLab	model
Interviewee:	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	. Resources
as	model's	actor:	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	. A B C
1. What	are	the	resources	do	you	need	to	perform	your	tasks,	to	achieve	your
objectives	?
What	does	matter	for	you?
2. On	who	do	you	depend	to	access	the	resource,	to	use	it	according	to	your
own	need?	Who	controls	the	resource?
<actor
name>
<actor
name>
<actor
name>
3. How	much	important	is	that	resource	for	your	own	work	(on	a	scale	0	…	10)?
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What	is	the	behavior	of	the	person	who	controls	the	resource	that	would	be:
4. a-	the	worst	case	for	you?	describe	this	behavior
5. assess	the	effect	of	this	behavior	on	your	capability	to	achieve	your
objectives	(on	a	scale	-10	…	0)
6. b-	the	best	case	for	you?	describe	this	behavior
7. assess	the	effect	(on	a	scale	0	…	10)
8. c-	the	neutral	case,	neither	favourable	or	unfavourable?	describe	this
behavior
9. assess	the	effect	(on	a	scale	-10	…	+10)
10. d-	the	behavior	that	you	experience	usually?
describe	this	behavior
11. assess	the	effect	(on	a	scale	-10	…	+10)
12. Who	does	matter	for	you?
favorably	(on	a	scale	0	…	10)
adversely	(on	a	scale	-10	…	0)
actor	XX:	.	.	.	.	.
actor	YY:	.	.	.	.	.
.	.	.
Dealing	with	some	organizational	patterns
5.15 The	metamodel	SocLab	as	it	is	shown	in	Figure	3	is	quite	simple.	This	simplicity	warrants	the	practical	feasibility	of	designing	understandable
models	but	it	could	hamper	the	analyst	to	describe	aspects	of	the	organization	that	he	wants	to	account	and	study.	In	fact,	the	primitive
elements	of	this	metamodel	may	be	combined	into	higher	level	elements	allowing	to	account	for	more	specific	organizational	patterns.	Let	us
give	some	examples.
5.16 One	can	have	to	deal	with	an	actor	who	either	is	rather	marginal,	because	he	does	not	take	an	active	part	to	the	operating	of	the
organization,	or	is	less	engaged	in	the	game,	because	his	social	capital	provides	him	valuable	alternatives	to	being	member	of	the
organization	so	that	he	can	limit	his	participation	to	the	game.	To	express	such	a	position	of	an	actor	in	the	model	of	an	organization,	one	may
introduce	a	relation	whose	he	is	the	controller	and	the	only	one	dependent	actor,	with	an	amount	of	stake	in	proportion	with	his	level	of
retirement.	Then,	this	actor	will	be	less	sensitive	than	others	to	variations	in	the	organization's	state,	and	thus	less	reactive.	Another	way	to
model	this	position,	whether	it	is	(explained	as)	due	to	the	actor's	temperament,	is	to	provide	him	with	a	low	level	of	tenacity,	a	psycho-
cognitive	trait	of	actors	that	will	be	introduced	in	the	following	section.
5.17 This	issue	is	related	to	the	boundaries	of	the	system,	which	may	be	more	or	less	fuzzy.	This	phenomenon	is	also	taken	into	account	by	the
relevance	(i.e.	the	total	amount	of	stakes)	of	the	relations	controlled	by	an	actor:	more	the	relevance	of	the	relations	controlled	by	an	actor	is
low,	more	this	actor	is	peripheral.
5.18 There	exist	alliances	or	actors'	coalitions	that	play	a	significant	role	in	the	functioning	of	an	organization	and	thus	must	be	accounted.	A	2-
actors	coalition	is	well	described	by	a	reciprocal	solidarity	between	these	actors.	For	a	broader	coalition,	a	fist	solution	is	to	personify	the
coalition	as	a	collective	actor	having	his	own	means	of	action	(the	relations	it	controls)	and	objectives	(the	relations	it	depends	on),	while
making	the	coalition	members	solidary	with	the	coalition-actor	in	proportion	to	their	dependency	on	the	coalition	success.	This	modelling
assumes	a	tight	coordination	between	the	coalition	members.	Another	solution	is	to	model	the	coalition	as	a	virtual	actor	who	controls	no
relation,	where	each	member	is	solidary	with	the	coalition-actor	in	proportion	to	his	involvement.	This	latter	solution	models	a	de	facto
coalition:	the	members	share	interests	and	behave	accordingly,	but	they	do	not	explicitly	coordinate	their	behaviors.	In	both	solutions,	the
cohesion	of	the	coalition	will	be	expressed	by	solidarity	links	from	the	coalition	towards	its	members.	Adjusting	the	levels	of	stakes	and
solidarities	allows	to	model	a	wide	variety	of	cases.
5.19 The	SocLab	model	of	an	organization	focuses	on	relationships	inside	the	organization,	not	on	the	interactions	between	the	organization	and
its	environment.	To	take	into	account	dependences	of	the	organization	with	respect	to	its	environment,	the	model	can	include	relations	that
are	not	controlled	by	an	organization's	actor.	These	relations	correspond	to	resources	which	are	needed	by	the	organization	and	provided	by
the	environment.	The	state	of	these	external	relations	is	fixed	since	it	is	not	under	the	control	of	the	organization.	The	analyst	determines	their
value	and	may	vary	them	to	test	different	hypotheses	about	the	environment's	behavior.	Another	possibility	is	to	introduce	the	environment	as
an	actor	which	controls	and	depends	on	relations	but	whose	behavior	is	fixed	(that	is,	b_minr	=	b_maxr	for	the	relations	it	controls)	Many
social	games	may	be	viewed	as	multi-scale	nested	games,	or	systems	of	systems.	At	each	level,	the	game	involves	its	own	actors,	resources
and	stakes,	and	these	games	interact	first	by	the	fact	that	some	actors	take	part	to	games	staying	at	different	levels	second,	by	the	fact	that
rules	of	the	game	at	a	given	level	are	framed	by	the	outcomes	of	the	encompassing	game	and	third,	the	outcomes	of	a	game	can	have	a
retro-effect	on	the	upper	level.	In	the	model	of	an	organization,	it	is	possible	for	any	actor	to	correspond	to	a	collective,	in	fact	a	sub-
organization	that	can	be	"opened"	and	in	turn	modelled	as	an	organization.	So,	it	is	possible	to	define	a	network	of	organizations	that	interact
through	actors	that	belong	to	several	(sub-)organization	and	through	relations	that	constraint	another	one	or	are	controlled	by	an	actor	of	one
organization	while	the	depending	actors	belong	to	one	or	several	other	organizations.	The	possibility	to	refine	the	description	of	an	actor	in	the
form	of	an	organization,	that	is	to	recursively	apply	the	modelling	process,	enables	to	catch	a	significant	part	of	the	complexity	of	the
interplays	between	systems	of	organized	action.
Simulation:	Playing	the	Social	Game
6.1 As	we	have	seen	in	section	3.26,	an	organization	defines	a	social	game,	where	each	actor	adjusts	the	state	of	the	relations	he	controls	in
order	to	obtain	from	others	an	acceptable	level	of	"satisfaction".	Doing	so,	he	modifies	the	satisfaction	of	actors	depending	on	the	relations	he
controls,	who	in	turn	…	Actors	are	mutually	dependent	.	When	the	game	reaches	a	stationary	state,	the	organization	is	in	a	regulated
configuration:	every	actor	gets	an	acceptable	satisfaction	and	no	longer	needs	to	modify	his	behavior.	The	social	game	is	nothing	but	a	model
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/16/4/8.html 13 15/10/2015
of	the	regulation	process	by	which	the	actors	of	social	organizations	stabilize,	at	least	partly,	their	behaviors[12].
6.2 To	compute	how	an	organization	could	be	regularized,	its	socially	plausible	regulated	configurations,	we	may	conduct	simulations	of	the	social
game.	We	just	have	to	implement	the	model	of	the	organization	as	a	Multi-Agent	System,	where	each	actor	is	represented	by	an	agent
endowed	with	a	rationality	which	enables	him	to	play	the	social	game	in	search	of	an	acceptable	satisfaction.	We	outline	here	the	principles	of
the	social	game	player	algorithm	implemented	in	the	SocLab	platform,	many	more	details	are	presented	in	(El	Gemayel	et	al.	2011,	El
Gemayel	2013	and	Sibertin-	Blanc	et	al.	2013a)	[13].
The	social	actors'	rationality
6.3 According	to	SOA,	the	behavior	of	social	actors	is	strategic:	each	one	seeks	to	get	from	others	the	highest	level	of	satisfaction	and	to	this	end,
he	uses	the	resources	he	masters	as	action	levers	to	influence	the	behavior	of	others.	The	relative	stability	of	actors'	behaviors	stems	from
this	characteristic.	However,	this	behavior	is	exercised	within	the	framework	of	a	bounded	rationality	(Simon	1982):	social	actors	are	poorly
aware	of	the	structure	and	the	current	state	of	the	game,	have	limited	cognitive	capacity,	can	not	spend	the	time	and	energy	required	to	find
the	best	solution,	have	only	a	vague	idea	of	the	outcomes	of	each	action,	and	look	only	for	a	"satisficing"	level	of	satisfaction,	which	is	not
predetermined.
6.4 We	do	not	rely	actors'	behaviors	on	an	hypothetical	formal	theory	of	social	games	and	assume	that	most	social	competences	are	acquired	by
experience.	So,	the	algorithm	is	grounded	upon	the	classic	self-learning	paradigm	by	trial-error	and	reinforcement	(Sutton	and	Barto	1998).
Under	this	approach,	an	individual	experiences	the	reactions	of	the	environment	to	the	actions	he	undertakes	in	order	to	gradually	learn	what
is	the	best	behavior	to	reach	the	objective.	To	this	end,	each	agent	builds	and	updates	a	rule	base	that	associate	actions	to	situations	(or
cases).	Each	rule	is	of	the	form	(situation,	action,	strength)	where:
situation	is	the	vector	of	impacts	perceived	by	the	agent	from	each	of	the	relations	he	depends	on;
action	is	a	vector	of	changes	in	the	state	of	the	relations	controlled	by	the	agent;
force	is	an	evaluation	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	rule.
6.5 A	rule	is	applicable	when	its	component	situation	is	"close",	according	to	an	Euclidean	distance,	to	the	agent's	current	situation.	When	no	rule
is	applicable,	for	example	at	the	beginning	of	the	simulation,	a	new	rule	(current	situation,	random	action,	default	force)	is	generated.
6.6 The	game	stabilizes	when	every	actor-agent	gains	an	acceptable	level	of	satisfaction.	To	determine	the	acceptability	threshold,	each	agent
maintains	an	ambition	variable	(Selten	1998):	a	state	of	the	organization	is	acceptable	for	an	agent	if	its	current	level	of	satisfaction	is	greater
than	its	ambition.	The	initial	value	of	an	agent's	ambition	is	set	to	its	highest	possible	satisfaction	and,	according	to	the	reality	principle,
ambition	decreases	toward	the	actual	level	of	satisfaction	obtained	by	the	agent.
The	psycho-cognitive	parameters	of	the	algorithm
6.7 Three	psycho-cognitive	parameters	are	associated	with	each	agent	to	account	the	actor's	individual	dispositions:
The	tenacity	(between	1	and	10)	determines	his	propensity	to	focus	on	the	exploration	of	new	configurations	or	on	the	exploitation	of
knowledge	already	acquired	(March	1991);
The	discriminability	(between	1	and	5)	determines	his	ability	to	discriminate	situations,	as	the	distance	between	the	current	situation
and	the	situation	component	of	a	rule	that	makes	it	applicable	or	not;	if	it	is	set	to	1,	each	rule	is	applicable	in	any	case;
The	reactivity	(between	1	and	10)	determines	the	relative	weight	of	what	the	agent	has	already	learned	with	regard	to	the	information
gained	at	the	current	step	of	the	simulation.
The	algorithm
6.8 The	main	variables	of	the	algorithm	are	the	ambition	and	the	exploration/exploitation	rate	of	each	agent.	The	explore/exploit	rate	of	an	agent
determines	whether	it	searches	to	acquire	knowledge	about	states	of	the	organization	which	are	quite	remote	from	the	current	state	or
whether	he	rather	intends	to	improve	the	knowledge	he	has	already	acquired.
6.9 A	simulation	runs	until	the	satisfaction	of	every	agent	passes	above	its	ambition.	The	main	steps	of	the	algorithm	executed	by	each	agent	to
select	an	action	are	as	follows:
1.	 the	agent	perceives	its	situation	and	the	resulting	level	of	satisfaction;
2.	 it	updates	its	explore/exploit	rate	according	to	its	tenacity,	its	reactivity	and	the	gap	between	ambition	and	satisfaction[14];
3.	 it	updates	its	ambition	according	to	the	explore/exploit	rate	and	the	gap	between	its	satisfaction	and	ambition	to	bring	closer	the	two;
4.	 it	updates	the	force	of	the	last	and	penultimate	rules	applied,	according	to	the	gap	between	its	current	and	previous	satisfactions	and
the	explore/exploit	rate;
5.	 it	searches	in	its	rule	base	for	applicable	rules	according	to	its	discriminability.	If	any,	it	selects	one	of	the	stronger	ones;	else	it
creates	a	new	rule	according	to	the	explore/exploit	rate	(more	the	agent	explores,	more	the	changes	in	the	states	of	controlled
relations	are	important).
Once	every	agent	has	made	its	choice	(step	5),	the	selected	actions	are	applied.
6.10 An	essential	property	of	this	algorithm	is	that	agents	have	very	few	knowledge	neither	about	the	structure	nor	the	state	of	the	game.	They
perceive	the	game	just	by	the	level	of	satisfaction	that	they	obtain	at	each	step	and,	if	their	discriminability	is	not	too	low,	they	distinguish
whether	two	situations	are	equivalent	or	not.	Doing	so,	this	algorithm	respects	the	opacity	that	prevails	in	relationships	between	social	actors
(David	et	al.	2002).
6.11 The	configurations	computed	by	this	algorithm	feature	expected	properties.	Compared	with	the	set	of	all	configurations	that	an	organization's
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structure	makes	possible,	they	appear	to	be	close	to	Pareto	optima,	while	the	configurations	featuring	the	biggest	gaps	between	the	agents'
levels	of	satisfaction	are	discarded.	To	the	extent	that	cooperation	has	not	a	too	much	detrimental	effect	on	their	own	satisfaction,	agents
adopt	a	cooperative	behavior.	This	corresponds	to	a	common	property	of	social	organizations,	whose	efficiency	and	steadiness	require	the
members'	cooperation.	In	particular,	more	the	cooperation	is	beneficial,	i.e.	more	the	gap	between	the	best	and	the	worst	configurations	is
great,	more	the	actors	cooperate,	i.e.	more	the	computed	configuration	is	close,	in	proportion,	to	the	bets	ones.	On	the	contrary,	zero-sum
organizations,	where	the	sum	of	the	actors'	satisfactions	is	null	for	any	configuration,	do	not	motivate	the	cooperation.	Since	any	gain	of	an
agent	is	lost	by	another	agent,	such	organization	model	do	not	ensure	the	convergence	of	the	algorithm[15].
6.12 The	data	analysis	of	simulation	outputs	are	means	to	improve	the	interpretation	of	simulation	results.	For	instance,	the	standard	deviation	and
the	number	of	steps	of	simulations	are	significant:	a	low	standard	deviation	over	a	number	of	simulations	indicates	that	the	actors'	behaviors
are	firmly	constrained	by	the	organization	structure;	the	length	of	simulations	indicates	whether	it	is	easy	or	difficult	for	the	actors	to	discover
collectively	how	to	cooperate.	The	correlations	between	relations'	states	and	between	actors'	satisfactions	are	also	very	instructive,	as	well
as	the	shape	of	clusters	among	computed	configurations	(Villa-Vialaneix	et	al.	2014).
6.13 Another	powerful	means	to	get	knowledge	from	simulation	results	is	to	compare	the	set	of	the	configurations	computed	by	simulation	with	the
set	of	all	the	configurations	that	the	structure	of	the	organization	makes	possible.	The	relative	position	of	the	computed	configurations	within
other	noteworthy	configurations	is	very	meaningful.
The	Analytical	Study	of	an	Organization
7.1 From	the	moment	that	the	model	of	an	organization	includes	more	than	four	or	five	actors,	it	becomes	difficult	to	understand	the	origin	of	the
regulation	that	emerges	from	simulations,	due	to	the	complexity	of	the	interactions	among	the	actors	that	are	framed	by	the	stakes,	the	shape
of	effect	functions,	the	solidarities	and	the	constraints	between	relations.
7.2 The	formal	definition	of	organizations'	models	as	algebraic	structures	(see	Table	3)	in	3.25	allows	us	to	define	tools	for	the	analytical	study	of
their	internal	properties	(Axelrod	1997)	and	so	to	shed	light	on	deep	structural	features.
The	indexes
7.3 The	algebraic	structure	of	(the	model	of)	an	organization	enables	to	define	and	compute	the	value	of	many	mathematical	expressions,	called
indexes,	that	turns	out	to	be	meaningful	for	the	sociologist.	Some	of	these	indexes	are	contextual—their	value	is	a	function	of	the	considered
state	of	the	organization—while	other	are	structural—they	are	state-independent	and	bring	information	about	the	very	structure	of	the
organization.	Moreover,	one	may	consider	dyadic	indexes	which	relate	two	actors,	one	relation	and	one	actor	or	two	relations,	and	monadic
indexes	which	bear	on	one	actor,	one	relation	or	the	whole	organization.	The	scales	of	value	of	these	indexes	are	arbitrary,	so	only
comparisons	make	sense	and	they	must	be	carefully	interpreted	in	sociological	terms.	Most	of	them	may	also	be	computed	in	proportion
within	their	range	of	value,	typically	as	(value	-	minimum_value)	/	(maximum_value	-	minimum_value);	such	ratings	are	also	informative	and
allow	to	compare	indexes	having	different	scales	of	value.
7.4 We	give	examples	of	such	indexes	regarding	the	actors'	capability	and	power:
7.5 Dyadic	contextual	indexesassociated	with	a	state	of	the	organization:
gap(a,	b,	s)	=	capability(a,	s)	-	capability(b,	s);
relative_dependency(a,	b,	s)	=	power(a,	b,	s)	-	power(b,	a,	s);
link(a,	b,	s)	=|power(a,	b,	s)|	+	|power(b,	a,	s)|,	how	much	the	two	actors	are	tied;
concession(a,	b,	s)	=	Σr	;	a	controls	r	AND	b	depends	on	r	Maxs{impact(r,	a,	s)}	-	impact(r,	a,	s),	the	amount	of	capability	that	actor	a
abandons	in	his	relations	with	actor	b;
benevolence(a,	b,	s)	=	Σr;	a	controls	r	AND	b	depends	on	r	impact(r,	b,	s)	-	Mins'{impact(r,	b,	s')},	the	amount	of	capability	that	actor	a	freely
gives	to	actor	b;
transactional	benefit(a,	b,	s)	=	benevolence(b,	a,	s)	-	concession(a,	b	s),	the	capability	balance	of	a's	behavior	with	regard	to	b
(Mailliard	and	Sibertin-Blanc	2010);
constraint(r,	r',	s)	=	20	-	(on_bmaxr,	r'	(sr)	-	on_bmin r,	r'(sr)).
7.6 Dyadic	structural	indexes:	each	dyadic	contextual	index	provides	a	structural	index	defined	as	the	average	(or	any	aggregate	of	the	values),
minimum	or	maximum	values,	the	standard	deviation	or	the	amplitude	of	values	over	the	state	variable.	The	strength	of	a	relation	on	an	actor,
defined	as	strength(r,	a)	=	maxs{impact(r,	a,	s)}	-	mins	{,impact(r,	a,	s)},	provides	also	a	structural	version	of	most	contextual	indexes,	by
substituting	the	impact	of	a	relation	on	an	actor	by	its	strength.	Solidarities	between	actors	and	constraints	between	relations	are	other
indexes.
7.7 Monadic	contextual	indexes:	every	dyadic	contextual	index	provides	a	monadic	index	associated	with	one	of	the	terms	by	averaging,
summing[16]	or	aggregating	in	any	way,	maximizing	or	minimizing	the	values	over	the	other	term.	The	autonomy(a,	s)	=	power(a,	a,	s)	is	the
amount	of	capability	of	an	actor	that	depends	on	himself;	dependency(a,	s)	=	capability(a,	s)	-	autonomy(a,	s)	is	the	complement	of	autonomy.
7.8 Monadic	structural	indexes:	monadic	indexes	may	be	deduced	from	the	dyadic	structural	ones,	in	the	same	way	that	monadic	contextual
indexes	are	deduced	from	dyadic	contextual	ones.	The	relevance	of	a	relation,	is	the	sum	of	the	stakes	put	on	this	relation.
7.9 Finally,	Global	contextual	or	structural	indexes,	bearing	on	the	whole	organization,	can	be	derived	from	monadic	indexes	by	averaging	or
aggregating	the	values	over	all	the	actors	or	relations[17].	We	do	not	elaborate	on	the	sociological	interpretation	of	this	number	of	indexes,	this
would	require	a	quite	long	discussion	(Roggero	2008).	The	questions	that	arise	when	one	investigate	a	specific	aspect	of	a	concrete
organization	are	also	very	numerous	and	diverse,	and	each	of	these	indexes	is	susceptible	of	shedding	light	on	a	facet	of	a	specific	question.
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The	Configuration	Space	of	an	Organization
7.11 Each	configuration	of	the	organization	supplies	a	distribution	of	capabilities	among	the	actors	(and	the	same	holds	for	power,	satisfaction	and
influence).	Since	the	relations'	effects	are	continuous	functions	and	the	impacts	on	actors	are	aggregated	by	means	of	a	continuous	operator,
the	capability	of	an	actor	features	the	properties	of	a	scalar	field	defined	over	the	spaces	of	behaviors	of	the	relations,	and	it	may	be
represented	as	a	"landscape"	like	in	Figure	5	(Chapron	2012).	The	same	holds	for	the	aggregation	by	a	continuous	operator	of	the
landscapes	of	a	group	or	of	all	the	actors	of	the	organization.
Figure	5.	Projection	of	the	landscape	of	actor	a1's	capability	on	relations	r1	and	r2
7.12 Standard	mathematical	tools	may	be	used	to	compute	properties	of	landscapes	such	as	(Chapron	2012):
the	gradient	of	a	landscape,	and	thus	its	optima,	minima	and	saddle	points;
the	scalar	product	of	the	gradient	vectors	of	two	landscapes	(of	two	actors,	two	groups	of	actors	or	one	actor	versus	a	group),
considering	or	not	the	components	corresponding	to	controlled	relations;
the	topography	of	a	landscape,	that	is	the	shape,	the	size	and	the	distribution	of	hills	and	depressions	(the	area	providing	a	capability
that	is	higher	or	lower	than	a	given	threshold);
a	measure	of	the	(dis)similarity	between	two	landscapes,	either	at	some	configuration	or	considering	the	whole	landscapes.
7.13 The	systematic	exploration	of	the	(finite)	state	space	of	an	organization	also	allows	to	identify	configurations	that	feature	noteworthy
properties	as	well	as	the	fulfillment	of	structural	properties	of	the	organization	as	a	whole:
the	configurations	that	maximize	or	minimize	the	capability	of	a	given	actor	or	of	a	group	of	actors,	and	the	configurations	that	are
favorable	(or	not)	to	the	whole	organization;
the	configurations	that	correspond	to	Pareto	optima	or	to	Nash	equilibria,	that	maximize	or	minimize	the	standard	deviation,	the
median,	highest	or	lowest	capability;
structural	conflicts	between	actors	having	opposite	landscapes	or	in	local	conflict	at	a	configuration	where	the	scalar	product	of	their
gradients	is	negative:	what	is	good	for	one	of	them	is	bad	for	the	other	and	reciprocally;
conversely,	similarity	of	interests	between	actors,	and	actors	that	could,	for	various	reasons,	take	advantage	to	constitute	a	coalition
(by	an	additional	coordination	of	their	behaviors);
instability	of	a	configuration	if	components	of	the	gradient	of	a	landscape	have	a	high	value:	any	accidental	change	in	the	state	of	the
corresponding	relations	can	give	rise	to	a	significant	reaction	of	the	actor	and	then	provoke	the	change	of	all	actors'	behaviors	in	a
chain	reaction;
cooperativeness	of	the	organization	in	the	case	there	is	at	least	one	quite	large	and	central	(i.e.	easy	to	find)	area	of	the	space	of
configurations	that	provides	to	most	of	the	influential	actors	a	substantial	benefit	to	cooperate;
variety	of	the	organization,	in	the	case	there	are	several	such	areas	or	smaller	areas	which	are	close	to	each	other.
7.14 Another	way	to	investigate	the	structure	of	an	organization	is	to	consider	networks	of	actors,	or	of	actors	and	relations,	whose	node	are
labelled	monadic	indexes	and	edge	by	dyadic	indexes.	They	can	be	studied	thanks	to	the	numerous	tools	developed	in	the	framework	of	the
social	networks	analysis	(Jackson	2008),	for	example	to	reveal	the	centrality	or	the	specificity	of	an	actor	(Chapron	et	al.	2011).
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7.15 The	results	of	such	studies	shed	light	on	macro	properties	of	the	structure	of	an	organization	that	could	on	the	one	hand	formally	explain	why
an	actor	is	empirically	observed	to	behave	as	he	does	and	improve	the	understanding	of	the	regulated	configuration	computed	by	simulation.
On	the	other	hand,	since	the	organization	is	a	social	construct,	actors	try	to	make	it	to	evolve,	as	much	as	they	hope	to	get	some	advantage
from	this	evolution.	These	structural	properties	give	insights	into	the	direction	of	the	macro-level	changes	that	an	actor	could	be	tempted	to
undertake	in	order	to	improve	or	strengthen	his	position.
7.16 The	SocLab	platform	allows	the	user	to	get	the	value	of	many	of	the	above-mentioned	indexes.	It	also	allows	to	know	which	are	configurations
featuring	a	noteworthy	property	and	to	interactively	explore	the	organization's	space	of	configurations;	each	configuration	is	detailed	by	giving
the	states	of	the	relations	and	the	amount	(in	value	and	in	proportion)	of	capability	and	satisfaction	given	by	each	actor	to	each	other	by
means	of	the	controlled	relations	or	the	solidarities.	As	an	example,	Figure	6	displays	data	about	the	configuration	that	maximizes	the	sum	of
all	actors'	satisfactions	(in	the	case	of	this	model,	there	is	only	one	such	configuration,	and	it	is	nearly	the	same	which	maximizes	the	sum	of
actors'	capabilities).
(a)	the	array	mode
(b)	the	graphical	mode
Figure	6.	The	window	of	the	SocLab	platform	that	allows	the	user,	in	the	left	hand	part,	to	select	a	configuration	of	the	organization	model
while	the	right	part	displays	data	about	that	configuration.	The	array	mode	(a)	shows	the	detail	of	the	values	of	actors'	satisfaction	(in	row)
and	influence	(in	column)	in	value	or	in	proportion;	the	graphical	mode	(b)	uses	histograms	to	represent	the	values.
Analysis	of	the	Case
8.1 We	present	the	results	of	100	simulation	runs	of	the	model	of	the	basin	Touch	action	system	with	the	same	medium	values	of	psycho-
cognitive	parameters	for	all	actors:	2	for	discriminability,	5	for	tenacity	and	reactivity.	A	sensitivity	analysis	of	the	tenacity	and	reactivity
parameters	provides	similar	results.
Simulation	results
8.2 In	average,	simulations	converge,	i.e.	a	stationary	state	is	reached,	in	5434	steps.	Table	6	shows	that	standard	deviations	are	quite	low	in
comparison	with	other	organizations,	regarding	the	fact	that	the	range	of	the	actors'	satisfactions—that	is	the	difference	between	the
maximum	and	the	minimum	satisfactions	of	each	actor,	as	shown	in	table	8—is	130	in	average.	This	may	be	interpreted	as	a	strong
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regulation	of	the	system	of	action,	actors	being	quite	firm	in	their	respective	positions.
8.3 Table	7	shows	the	distribution	of	capability	at	the	convergence	state.	In	columns,	the	impact	of	each	actor	on	all	others	due	to	the	relation	he
controls	with,	at	the	last	row,	his	power	as	the	sum	of	his	impacts	on	others.	In	rows,	the	amount	of	capability	gained	by	each	actor	from
others,	accounting	for	his	stakes	and	solidarities.	The	two	last	columns	show	the	resulting	satisfaction	in	value	and	in	proportion	with	regard
to	his	maximum	satisfaction.	The	mean	value	of	actors'	satisfaction	is	53.
8.4 Table	8	is	a	view	of	a	structural	property	of	the	action	system.	It	allows	to	compare	the	configurations	of	the	system	that	are	the	best	and	the
worst	for	each	actor	and	for	the	whole	system.	For	instance,	among	the	maximum	satisfactions,	one	corresponding	to	downstream	town
(providing	him	satisfaction	110)	is	the	lowest	for	the	whole	system	(providing	a	global	satisfaction	405),	while	the	best	configuration	for	SIAH
(providing	him	satisfaction	71)	is	the	highest	for	the	whole	system	(providing	a	global	satisfaction	560).	Regarding	the	configurations	of
minimum	satisfactions,	they	are	the	same	for	AEAG	and	Regional	council,	as	for	SIAH	and	the	whole	system.
Table	6:	The	convergence	state,	defined	as	the	average	values	of	the	relations	states	at	the	ends	of	100	runs,
with	the	standard	deviation	of	relations	and	of	the	satisfaction	of	the	actor	that	controls	this	relation
average	value standard	deviation standard	deviation
of	the	controller	actor's
satisfaction
Validation 9.98 0.1 1.6
Expertise 4.7 4.0 1.7
Funding 6.79 1.5 1.1
Lobbying 9.33 0.6 0.7
Control	of	flow 7.7 0.5 3.0
Self	funding 6.36 1.6 4.0
River	management 4.94 1.1 2.5
Add.	funding	CR 6.53 1.6 2.1
Add.	funding	DR 6.66 1.5 1.3
Studies 5.29 3.7 3.0
Table	7:	The	impact	of	each	actor	(in	column)	on	others	(in	rows)	at	the	convergence	state	with,	in	the	last	column	and
rows,	the	resulting	satisfactions	and	powers;	the	cooperative	power	(last	line)	considers	only	positive	impacts.
1.
DDT
2.
ONEMA
3.
AEAG
4.
Riparian
Farmers
5.
Upstream
towns
6.
Downstr.
towns
7.
SIAH
8.
Regional
Council
9.
Depart.
Council
10.
Engin.
Firm
Satisfaction Percentage
of
maximum
satisfaction
DDT 18.8 2.5 8.6 4.3 3.9 -0.6 14.7 1.8 3.3 -0.3 57.0 94.0%
ONEMA 11.9 12.0 19.2 -1.5 -6.1 2.0 14.6 0.9 1.0 0.1 54.1 84.6%
AEAG 8.6 3.3 33.7 0.2 -8.9 2.7 17.1 3.6 3.8 0.1 64.2 86.8%
Riparian
Farmers
4.1 0.1 2.9 33.3 19.1 -14.3 12.2 0.1 0.3 -2.3 55.7 82.6%
Upstream
towns
6.6 0.5 1.8 15.2 33.2 -17.1 11.0 0.5 1.0 -2.7 49.9 81.6%
Downstream
towns
7.0 3.7 14.5 -11.2 -24.8 31.3 9.7 1.8 2.0 2.8 36.8 60.5%
SIAH 6.6 0.3 15.6 1.8 0.1 9.7 21.4 0.5 0.8 0.2 57.0 89.6%
Regional
Council
6.8 1.7 14.4 0.3 -2.7 4.0 11.1 15.0 2.9 0.1 53.6 93.1%
Departmental
Council
10.7 2.4 12.8 0.4 -2.9 -0.4 13.1 4.4 13.8 0.0 54.2 89.2%
Engineering
Firm
13.6 2.2 11.3 -5.0 -7.3 3.9 16.0 0.8 0.8 11.6 47.8 76.3%
Power 94.7 28.6 134.8 73.0 109.0 86.2 141.0 29.4 29.5 20.2
Coop.	power 94.7 28.6 134.8 55.4 56.4 53.7 141.0 29.4 29.5 14.9
Table	8.	In	columns,	the	configurations	corresponding	to	the	maximum	and	the	minimum	satisfaction	of	each	actor	and	of	the	whole	organization
(i.e.	the	sum	of	actors'	satisfactions);	in	the	rows,	the	state	of	relations	and	the	satisfactions	of	actors.
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Interpretation	of	results
8.5 The	analysis	of	the	simulation	results	allows	us	to	examine,	in	terms	of	power	relationships,	the	hypotheses	about	the	action	system	of	basin
Touch	derived	from	the	results	gained	by	the	Actor-Network	and	Territorial	Public	Interest	theories	(Cf.	2.15).	The	first	three	hypotheses	are
clearly	confirmed,	while	the	fourth	is	not.	The	convergence	state	is	interpreted	as	a	regularized	configuration	and,	on	the	whole,	it	matches
the	one	observed	by	the	field	investigation[18].
8.6 Hypothesis	1:	To	be	the	"obligatory	passage	point"	of	the	Actor-Network,	is	that	SIAH	has	enough	power	to	somehow	constrain	other	actors?
The	results	in	table	7	show	that	SIAH	is	the	actor	having	the	highest	level	of	power	(141)	at	the	convergence	configuration,	with	a	significant
gap	-	except	with	AEAG	(the	Water	Agency).	Moreover,	this	high	level	of	power	is	purely	cooperative:	SIAH	is	in	conflict	with	no	actor	in	the
system.	SIAH	is	the	one	who	gives	others	the	more	capability	for	action.	It	therefore	appears	to	be	the	"obligatory	passage	point"	for	the
proper	functioning	of	the	system,	since	he	is	the	one	who	gives	them	the	means	to	cooperate.	Another	element,	structural,	tends	to	confirm
this	central	position	of	SIAH:	the	configurations	that	maximize	and	minimize	the	system's	whole	satisfaction,	i.e.	the	sum	of	all	actors'
satisfactions	(see	table	8).	The	configuration	that	provides	SIAH	with	the	highest	satisfaction	(71)	is	very	close	to	the	one	that	maximizes	the
system's	whole	satisfaction	(579).	In	other	words,	the	more	SIAH	has	the	means	to	achieve	his	goals,	the	more	all	actors	do.	The	same	holds
in	the	opposite:	the	configuration	that	minimizes	the	SIAH's	satisfaction	(-62)	also	minimizes	the	system's	whole	satisfaction	(-347).	The	SIAH
appears	as	embodying	the	"Territorial	public	interest"	of	basin	Touch—the	action	system	works	properly	if	and	only	if	the	SIAH	has	the
means	to	be	active.
8.7 Hypothesis	2:	Purposing	to	play	an	important	role	and	to	introduce	a	change	in	the	management	of	flood	risk,	is	that	SIAH	has	the	means	to
do	so?
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This	is	to	examine	the	state	of	the	relationship	controlled	by	SIAH,	which	is	4.9	in	average.	Recall	that	negative	values	represent	situations
where	SIAH	does	not	act	as	he	wishes	with	respect	to	flood	risk	management.	They	produce	a	negative	capability	for	himself.	In	contrast,
positive	values	are	associated	with	positive	and	increasing	capability	and	reflect	situations	where	SIAH	may	more	and	more	act	in	the	way	he
wants,	that	is	to	say	promote	an	hydromorphology	which	includes	risk	prevention.	Value	4.9	corresponds	to	a	situation	where	SIAH	exerts	his
action	in	the	direction	he	wants	and,	being	an	"obligatory	passage	point",	he	incites	the	whole	system	of	action	to	go	in	this	direction.
However,	not	as	much	as	it	could	be	possible.	He	is	limited	by	the	interplay	of	actors	and	regulatory	constraints,	particularly	because	it	is	the
DDT	which	investigates	and	appraises	cases	of	FRPP	and	continues	to	apply	a	rigid	regulatory	framework	taking	little	account	of	local	actors.
This	limitation	is	the	price	to	pay	for	his	strategy	whose	consensual	nature	is	necessary	for	the	enrolment	of	other	actors.	The	resulting
configuration	of	the	action	system	provides	SIAH	with	a	satisfaction	of	57,	corresponding	to	89	%	of	his	maximum	satisfaction,	which	is	quite
convenient.
8.8 Hypothesis	3:	In	the	enrolment	of	other	actors	on	the	service	of	an	hydromorphological	management	of	the	river,	is	that	SIAH	has	powerful
allies?
One	can	answer	in	the	affirmative:	SIAH	has	a	powerful	ally	in	AEAG.	On	the	one	hand,	AEAG	is	the	most	powerful	actor	after	SIAH	(134.8).
On	the	other	hand,	the	strong	contribution	of	AEAG	to	the	satisfaction	of	SIAH	(15.6),	and,	conversely,	the	important	contribution	of	SIAH	to
the	satisfaction	of	AEAG	(17.1)	demonstrate	the	existence	of	an	alliance	between	the	two	organizations.	Moreover,	the	study	of	correlations
over	the	100	runs	shows	that	the	satisfactions	of	SIAH	and	AEAG	are	highly	correlated	at	0.814.	This	alliance	is	certainly	important	for	SIAH,
since	he	is	funded	by	AEAG.	But	it	is	also	fully	convenient	for	AEAG:	the	high	state	of	the	relation	he	controls	(6.8)	shows	that	he	pursues	the
action	he	wishes;	the	resulting	configuration	provides	him	with	the	highest	level	of	satisfaction	of	the	action	system,	64.2.	Undoubtedly,	AEAG
firmly	contributes	to	the	enrolment	of	others	led	by	SIAH.
8.9 Hypothesis	4:	Is	that	the	agreement	on	the	"	Territorial	Public	Interest	"	is	confirmed	by	the	absence	of	major	conflict	in	the	system	of	action?
The	results	show	the	persistence	of	a	conflict	between	the	upstream	and	downstream	towns.	The	relative	agreement	on	an
hydromorphological	management	of	the	river	fails	to	resolve	the	conflict	between	their	respective	interests.	This	conflict	is	reflected	by	the
negative	contribution	that	the	first	offers	to	the	satisfaction	of	the	seconds	(-24.8)	and	vice	versa	(-17.1).	The	two	types	of	communes	adopt
strategies	that	remain	antagonistic	despite	the	action	of	SIAH.	This	conflict	is	to	the	detriment	of	downstream	towns.	He	is	the	less	satisfied
actor	(36.8)	at	a	level	that	is	significantly	below	average.	He	is	also	the	actor	that	exploits	the	less	his	possibilities	(60.8%)	while	all	others
manage	to	gain	more	than	80%	of	their	maximum	satisfaction.	One	explanation	of	this	failure	could	be	that,	in	fact,	downstream	towns	is	in
structural	conflict	with	the	whole	system	of	action:	table	8	shows	that	his	highest	satisfaction	(110)	is	the	lowest	(among	the	maximum
satisfactions)	for	the	whole	system	(405)	and	his	lowest	satisfaction	(-75)	is	the	highest	for	the	whole	system	(-72).	He	should	change	his
strategy	to	succeeds	in	negotiating	the	value	of	his	financial	support.	However,	the	configuration	corresponding	to	the	maximal	global
satisfaction	shows	that	there	exists	a	compromise,	but	it	is	not	accepted	by	Riparian	farmers	and	upstream	towns,	whose	satisfactions	would
decrease	from	55.7	to	51	and	49.9	to	43	respectively.
Conclusion
9.1 This	paper	does	not	primarily	present	an	agent-based	model	and	simulation	results	about	a	particular	case	or	phenomenon.	According	to	the
taxonomy	of	Boero	and	Squazzoni	(2005:	3),	the	metamodel	presented	in	section	3	and	4	falls	in	the	scope	of	"typification",	that	is	researches
which	"are	intended	to	investigate	some	theoretical	properties"	of	"	a	specific	class	of	empirical	phenomena	that	share	some	idealised
properties	"	and	are	the	object	domain	of	a	social	science	theory.	So,	we	have	presented	a	class	of	models	which	is	defined,	by	intention,	by
the	constitutive	elements	and	relationships	of	these	models,	as	shown	in	table	1.	Staying	at	a	higher	level	of	abstraction	than	the	level	of
particular	models,	it	is	then	possible	to	develop	mathematical	tools,	like	the	ones	introduced	in	section	7,	whose	definition	relies	on	the
common	structure	of	models	and	which	may	be	applied	to	each	model.	These	tools	allow	to	significantly	improve	the	interpretation	of	the
simulation	results	and,	quite	often,	as	for	the	case	studied	in	section	8,	they	bring	a	deeper	explanation	for	the	phenomena	that	emerge	from
simulations.	Moreover,	they	allow	to	compare	results	and	so	to	produce	knowledge	that	are	not	just	restricted	to	a	particular	case	but	are
generalizable	to	the	entire	class	of	models	(Boero	and	Squazzoni	2005).
9.2 The	SocLab	framework	is	a	matter	for	sociology,	not	for	management	sciences.	It	does	not	address	issues	related	to	the	performance	of	an
organization,	its	operational	efficiency	or	effectiveness,	or	the	contingent	relevance	of	its	structure	with	regard	to	its	environment	and	goals.	In
this,	it	differs,	among	many	others,	from	management-oriented	models	such	as	PCANS	(Krackhardt	and	Carley	1998),	ORA	(Carley	et	al.
2011)	and	the	28	models	examined	by	Ashworth	and	Carley	(2007),	from	organization-based	models	for	multi-agents	systems	such	as
MOISE	(Hubner	et	al.	2002;	Gâteau	et	al.	2005),	OPERA	(Dignum	and	Weigand	2003;	Penserini	et	al.	2009),	ISLANDER	(Esteva	et	al.	2001)
and	DEPINT	(Sichman	1998),	or	from	logic-based	models	of	power	relationships	(Castelfranchi	2003;	2011).	All	these	models	reduce	more	or
less	the	members	of	an	organization	to	the	strict	fulfillment	of	roles	assigned	to	them	by	the	rules	of	the	organization.	They	do	not	pay	much
attention	to	the	nature	of	human	beings	which,	as	stressed	by	(Ashworth	and	Carley	2007),	are	the	core	of	organizations	while	their	behaviors
feature	"a	seeming	defiance	of	theoretical	conformity".
9.3 This	framework	just	addresses	the	social	dimension	of	organizations,	assuming	that	it	deserves	to	be	considered	for	itself	and	that	it	is	an
essential	(if	not	the	main)	determinant	of	the	proper	functioning	of	any	organization.	To	this	end,	it	considers	the	instrumental	use	of	roles,
whether	defined	by	the	organization	or	introduced	by	the	actor	who	seizes	it,	which	are	handled	by	actors	as	both	opportunities	and
constraints	for	the	achievement	of	their	own	aims	and	the	recognition	of	themselves	by	others.	So,	SocLab	models	are	focused	on	power
relationships	which	stay	at	the	heart	of	the	dynamics	of	collective	action	systems[19].	This	framework	includes	analytical	tools	enabling	to
objectivize	the	relative	position	of	each	actor	in	the	current	configuration	of	the	organization	and	to	unveil	the	potentialities	of	other	possible
configurations.	Thanks	to	a	model	of	the	social	actor's	rationality,	mostly	interested	by	the	achievement	of	his	aims	but	suffering	from	cognitive
and	awareness	limitations,	the	simulation	enables	to	compute	how	an	organization	could	be	regulated.
9.4 We	have	presented	a	model	of	an	actor	system	concerned	by	the	definition	and	the	implementation	of	the	management	policy	of	a	small	river
in	SW	France.	In	the	context	of	first	an	increase	within	the	whole	society	of	concerns	for	ecological	issues	and	perspectives	and	second	the
socio-economic	problems	raised	by	the	frequent	floods	of	the	river,	the	research	question	for	the	sociologist	is	whether	there	is	an	evolution	in
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the	principles	of	the	river's	management	policy,	who	could	promote	this	evolution	and	whether	there	is	a	shared	agreement	on	these	new
principles.	These	interrogations	led	to	state	four	hypotheses	which	are	translated	into	technical	questions	for	the	model.	To	the	extent	that,	at
the	building	of	the	model,	the	translation	from	the	sociological	analysis	of	the	organization	into	the	SocLab	model	is	well	documented	and
substantiated,	the	findings	resulting	from	the	analysis	of	simulation	results	and	properties	of	the	model	are	easily	translated	back	in	the	terms
of	the	organization	under	consideration.	For	space	limitation,	it	was	not	possible	to	document	the	proposed	SocLab	model,	i.e.	to	document
the	relations	between	the	field	observations	and	the	model	constituents.	However,	we	have	shown	how	to	argue	that	the	first	three
hypotheses	to	be	checked	are	clearly	confirmed,	while	the	fourth	is	not.
9.5 The	main	domain	of	application	of	the	SocLab	framework	could	be	the	assessment	of	the	social	dimension	of	public	policies.	There	is	a
growing	demand	for	regulatory	impact	assessment,	see	e.g.	(European	Commission	2005),	including	the	social	dimension	which,	in	practice,
is	coped	with	great	difficulty.	Indeed,	the	discursive	statement	of	the	results	provided	by	most	sociological	analyses	does	not	feature	the
properties	of	quantitative	scientific	knowledge,	so	that	they	are	difficult	to	compare	and	integrate	with	results	provided	by	economics	and
environmental	sciences.	The	quantitative	results	provided	by	SocLab	makes	this	integration	possible,	as	experienced	in	the	Life	European
project	Concert'Eau	(Adreit	et	al.	2011).
9.6 We	believe	that	this	framework	is	also	relevant	for	integrated	assessment	(Toth	and	Hizsnyik	1998)	and	companion	modeling	processes
(Becu	et	al.	2003),	where	scientists	and/or	stakeholders	have	a	collective	interest	in	establishing	a	shared	representation	of	the	state	of
affairs.	In	this	context,	each	actor	will	have	the	possibility	to	express	his	own	view	in	a	formal	way,	which	includes	no	ambiguity	and	can	be
discussed	by	others;	the	agreed	and	problematic	points	can	be	clearly	identified.	Then,	SocLab	can	be	used	to	shed	light	on	the	causes	of
dysfunctions	and	to	investigate	the	impact	of	new	distributions	of	resources	among	the	actors.	The	SocLab	environment	may	also	be	used	to
undertake	practical	experiments	in	a	teaching	or	theoretical	context	(Roggero	2008).	As	for	well-circumscribed	concrete	organizations,	their
formal	study	entails	an	exposure	of	the	power	relationships,	what	enterprises,	associations	or	institution	do	wish	only	in	specific
circumstances.
Notes
1	http://soclabproject.wordpress.com
2	Morgan	addresses	different	aspects	of	the	organization	through	the	eight	following	images:	organizations	as	organisms,	as	machines,	as
political	systems,	as	psychic	prison,	as	flux	and	transformation,	as	culture,	as	brain	and	as	instruments	of	domination.
3	According	to	SOA,	ZUs	are	grounded	upon:	specific	competence	or	expertise;	the	control	of	interactions	with	the	environment	of	the
organization;	the	control	of	the	internal	communication;	and	the	knowledge	and	proper	use	of	the	organization	formal	rules.
4	The	power	of	an	individual	or	a	group,	a	social	actor,	is	"a	function	of	the	size	of	the	zone	of	uncertainty	that	the	unpredictability	of	the
actor's	conduct	enables	him	to	control	vis-a-vis	his	partners"	(Crozier	and	Friedberg	1980:	34).
5	Literally	"Syndicat	Intercommunal	d'Aménagement	Hydraulique"	of	the	Touch	river.	It	is	entrusted	by	the	State	with	the	maintenance	of	the
river	for	the	sake	of	the	riparian	proprietors,	which	own	the	bank	and	the	bed	of	the	river.	It	is	funded	by	the	Water	Agency.	See
http://www.siah-du-touch.org	for	more	details.
6	Actors	are	endowed	with	a	situated	rationality,	as	Friedberg	qualified	it	(Friedberg	1997).	This	was	to	highlight	the	limitations	raised	by
Simon,	and	to	link	the	rationality	to	the	context	of	action.
7	This	scale	is	also	arbitrary;	but	this	is	not	an	issue,	since	results	of	analysis	and	simulation	only	make	sense	in	comparison	one	to	another
or	as	a	rate	(the	position	of	its	actual	value	within	its	range).
8	It	is	also	relevant	to	consider	the	cooperative_power	(i.e.	the	sum	of	the	positive	impacts)	and	the	uncooperative_power	(i.e.	the	sum	of	the
negative	impacts)	of	an	actor.
9	One	can	also	impose	the	constraint	Σb	∈	A 	solidarity(a,	b)	=	1	to	keep	the	same	range	of	value	for	all	actors'	satisfactions,	or	other
constraints	such	as	Σb	∈	A 	|solidarity(a,	b)|	=	1.	To	clarify	the	sociological	interpretation	of	each	case	would	require	a	long	discussion.	The
default	value	is	solidarity(a,	b)	=	1	if	a	=	b,	0	else.
10	The	default	values	are	b_minr	=	-10	and	b_maxr	=	10.
11	The	default	values	are	on_bminr,	r'(sr)	=	-10	and	on_bmaxr,	r'	(sr)	=	10.
12	This	stability	is	required	for	the	anticipation	of	others'	actions,	and	thus	for	coordination.
13(Sandri	and	Sibertin-Blanc	2007)	also	shows	how	the	rationality	of	social	actors	can	be	modeled	within	a	fuzzy	framework.
14	When	the	gap	between	the	ambition	and	the	satisfaction	of	the	agent	decreases,	the	explore/exploit	rate	moves	toward	more	exploitation,
in	order	to	improve	the	possibility	for	the	satisfaction	to	overtake	the	ambition.	This	bias	favors	the	convergence	of	simulations,	i.e.	the	fact
that	the	satisfaction	of	each	agent	becomes	greater	than	his	ambition.	This	property	of	the	algorithm	models	the	fact	that	each	actor	who	is	a
member	of	an	organization	has	some	interest	in	the	prolongation	of	his	membership,	therefore	the	prolongation	of	the	organization,	and	thus
its	regulation.
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15	Concrete	social	organizations	are	not	zero-sum	games:	the	raison	d'être	of	any	organization	is	to	improve	the	collective	capability	of	its
members.
16	Concerning	the	power	of	an	actor,	one	may	include	or	not	the	power	he	exerts	on	himself.
17	Once	again,	there	are	many	ways	to	aggregate	monadic	or	diadic	indexes,	according	to	the	conception	of	social	or	organizational	welfare
(Arrow	et	al.	2002).
18	In	case	the	convergence	states	of	simulation	runs	are	quite	dispersed,	we	will	consider	that	the	organization	is	weakly	regulated	and
seems	feature	some	anomy.	In	case	the	convergence	states	of	simulation	runs	feature	several	modes,	or	clusters	which	can	be	highlighted	be
a	Hierarchical	Ascending	Classification	or	a	Principal	Component	Analysis,	one	could	be	expected	that	one	of	these	modes	corresponds	to
the	observed	configuration,	while	the	others	are	potentialities	of	the	organization	that	are	not	actualized	but	could	become	so	(Villa-Vialaneix
et	al.	2014).
19	This	paper	is	not	the	place	to	discuss	the	concept	of	power,	which	is	the	subject	of	a	considerable	literature;	we	just	notice	that,	despite
appearances,	the	contemporary	evolution	of	the	forms	of	authority	does	not	decrease	its	important	(Courpasson	et	al.	2012).
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